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Antitrust Law’s Harm to Competition:
A New Understanding of Exclusivity
ITTAI PALDOR†
One of the long-accepted axioms of antitrust law is that
the competitive danger posed by exclusivity agreements
increases as the market share foreclosed by these
arrangements increases. The larger the market share
foreclosed by an exclusivity agreement, the less likely the
arrangement is to be upheld by courts. And exclusivity
arrangements foreclosing extremely large market shares are
practically never upheld. The business community has
responded by forsaking such arrangements (or concealing
them). This Article challenges this very intuitive axiom. It
shows that due to an unobserved feature of exclusivity, when
extremely large market shares are foreclosed, the competitive
danger posed by these arrangements decreases. Exclusivity
arrangements foreclosing market shares of 85% and higher
should be presumed competitively benign, and therefore legal.
Several illustrative examples of industries, in which
widespread exclusivity should be allowed in contradiction to
the current understanding, are provided. The analysis
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developed in this Article suggests that for decades antitrust
law has been decreasing welfare by forcing businesses to steer
clear of a welfare-enhancing practice. The Article calls for a
change of this paradigm.
INTRODUCTION
In 2018, the Delaware District Court was motioned to
summarily dismiss an antitrust claim in Roxul v.
Armstrong.1 The plaintiff, a manufacturer of ceiling tiles,
alleged that defendant, a competing manufacturer of ceiling
tiles, had inhibited the growth of the plaintiff’s business by
signing exclusivity arrangements with key distributors.
Plaintiff explained that distributors were a critical channel
in the sale of ceiling tiles.2 Building constructors, who are the
end consumers of tiles, seldom buy tiles from any source
other than distributors, because distributors offer a wide
range of additional products and services.3 Manufacturers
therefore have no viable alternative to distributors, and tiles
are sold almost exclusively through distributors. Plaintiff
also claimed that there were very few distributors qualified
to distribute ceiling tiles.4 Defendant had signed exclusivity
contracts with the key distributors,5 thereby retarding the
growth of plaintiff’s business, as well as that of other tile
manufacturers. As a result, defendant was able to charge
more than 5% over competitive prices.6 Taking these
allegations to be true (as the court must when summary

1. Roxul USA, Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., No. 17-1258, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21513, at *3–4 (D. Del. Feb. 9, 2018).
2. Id. at *13.
3. Such as logistical planning, same-day delivery, other services, and
additional building products. Id. at *13–14.
4. Id. at *1, *13–14; see also id. at *3 (“Due to market forces, regional and
national distributors have consolidated resulting in limited numbers of
distributors capable of servicing [plaintiff] and [defendant].”).
5. Id. at *12–13.
6. Id. at *4.
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dismissal is sought),7 the court sided with plaintiff.
A year later, in 2019, the court denied defendant’s
motion to preclude an expert opinion submitted on behalf of
the plaintiff.8 The court again sided with the plaintiff,
finding that the assertions made in the expert opinion were
sufficient to be brought before a jury. Specifically, the court
found that an argument according to which the most efficient
(and largest) distributors had been foreclosed to competitors
constituted a sufficient allegation of competitive harm.9
In line with current antitrust theory and prevailing
antitrust law, both decisions were handed down without any
attempt to address a question that begs itself under the
circumstances: If the foreclosed distributors are indeed
indispensable from tile manufacturers’ perspectives, be it
because they are large, efficient, or for any other reason, why
did they agree to participate in a scheme that ultimately
resulted in higher prices charged to them? Would they not
have been better off turning down defendant’s exclusivity
offer? Surely, a refusal to grant exclusivity would have left
them with the choice of buying from any of several tile
manufacturers competing with each other. If the foreclosed
distributors can indeed bestow market power on, or withhold
market power from manufacturers (otherwise the
agreements in question would have been competitively
benign), distributors’ acquiescence is puzzling. They
willingly retarded competition at the manufacturers’ level
only to find themselves contractually obligated to purchase
exclusively from a seller who then charged them higher
prices.
An intuitive explanation for distributors’ acquiescence
would be a straightforward one—payment. The distributors

7. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Nat’l League of Postmasters of U.S., 497 F.3d
972, 975 (9th Cir. 2007).
8. Roxul USA, Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., No. 17-1258, 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 37925, at *2 (D. Del. Mar. 8, 2019).
9. Id. at *11.
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may have received consideration from the defendant
manufacturer in return for agreeing to the exclusivity
clauses.
But despite its intuitive appeal, this explanation is
unsatisfactory. The reason is that it requires a collective
action problem amongst distributors, which, under the
circumstances alleged by plaintiff, would have been
extremely unlikely, if not impossible. A detailed explanation
of the collective action problem that is a prerequisite for this
scenario is provided subsequently.10 Very briefly, it has long
been observed that anti-competitive exclusivity—exclusivity
that enhances a contracting party’s market power—is, in the
context discussed here, a zero-sum game. Any additional
dollar of profit that will accrue to one party as a result of its
newly-acquired market power will come at the expense of its
contractual counterpart. This, as will be explained, holds not
only when the agreement is struck between a seller and an
end consumer, but also when the parties are a wholesaler
and a retailer. Any profits accruing to the manufacturer as a
result of anti-competitive exclusivity will necessarily harm
the retailer. Importantly, the harm incurred by the retailer
will be precisely equal to the manufacturer’s gains from anticompetitive exclusivity. A mutually beneficial arrangement
whereby the manufacturer is granted market power and
distributors (as a group) profit from the arrangement is—
under this theory of competitive harm—impossible. This
understanding is neither novel nor controversial. It dates
back many years.11

10. See infra Section II.B.
11. The understanding is in fact the result of a debate, in which members of
the Chicago School initially argued that exclusivity can never produce an anticompetitive outcome. Compare RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 203–05 (1976), and ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF, 306–07 (1978), with Louis Kaplow & Carl
Shapiro, Antitrust, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1072, at 1204–05 (A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007). There are also other anticompetitive explanations for exclusivity, but these are more limited in scope, and
more controversial. As Kaplow & Shapiro point out, the presence of multiple
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If distributors face a collective action problem, some of
them may agree to grant the manufacturer exclusivity,
thereby securing the manufacturer’s dominant position.12
But under the circumstances alleged by the plaintiff in Roxul
v. Armstrong, in which there were only a few key distributors
(and apparently two large ones)13 who could withhold the
dominant position from, or bestow it upon, the manufacturer,
a collective action problem is unlikely.
As implausible as a collective action problem is under the
circumstances alleged by that plaintiff, this is not the key
point in the current context. Importantly for current
purposes, the court found no need to address these issues. In
line with the current understanding of exclusivity, the court
assumed that exclusivity agreements foreclosing a large
market share to competitors were more likely to harm
competition.14 Although the theoretical foundation for the
understanding of exclusivity is not new, its practical
implications have thus far been overlooked. Courts and
commentators continue to assume that exclusivity
arrangements foreclosing large market shares are likely to
harm competition.
It is this intuitive assumption that the current Article
challenges. The challenge launched in this Article does not
suggest that exclusivity arrangements never carry any anticompetitive potential. They definitely do. But paradoxically,
when extremely large market shares are foreclosed, the
buyers that leads to a free rider problem is “the factor that is probably most
important in antitrust challenges to exclusive dealing.” Louis Kaplow & Carl
Shapiro, Antitrust, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1072, at 1204 (A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007). For a survey of other
explanations, see id. at 1205–09 (focusing on the explanation developed in
Phillipe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, Contracts as Barriers to Entry, 77 AM. ECON.
REV. 388 (1987)). Note, however, that many settings in which exclusivity
contracts will increase the costs of entry under this explanation will not result in
harm to consumers.
12. See infra Section II.B.
13. Roxul, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37925, at *11–12.
14. Id. at *9–10, *13–14.
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market share foreclosed does not exacerbate the anticompetitive potential, but rather becomes a safeguard
against exclusivity’s anti-competitive potential. This feature
of exclusivity arrangements has, until now, been overlooked.
Yet it has important policy implications.
Exclusive dealing agreements are a widespread and
long-standing business practice.15 Such arrangements have
mixed welfare effects: On the one hand, they may generate
various cost-savings in production and distribution,16 which
in turn result in lower prices and increased output, an
undeniably welfare-enhancing effect.17 On the other hand,
they restrict competitors’ access to supply sources or
distribution outlets. If enough outlets are foreclosed,
exclusivity arrangements may exclude competitors from the
market altogether. This, in turn, may enhance or entrench
the market power of the party being granted exclusivity,
thereby enabling that party to elevate prices and restrict
output, resulting in the deadweight loss that is the hallmark
of market power’s exertion.18
As exclusivity arrangements have both welfareenhancing and welfare-reducing (anti-competitive) effects,
their legality is subject to the rule of reason analysis,19 which
calls for a balancing of their welfare-enhancing effects
against their anti-competitive effects under the specific
market circumstances.20 If the former outweigh the latter,

15. See Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exclusive Dealing, “Foreclosure,” and
Consumer Harm, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 314 (2002). For other early cases, see id.
at 314 n.8. For an early (documented) case, see Gale v. Reed (1806) 103 Eng. Rep.
274 (KB).
16. See infra Section II.A.
17. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 122 (2d ed. 1998).

OF

ANTITRUST

18. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 3–15 (5th ed. 2016).
19. Eisai, Inc. v. Sanofi Aventis U.S., LLC, 821 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 2016).
20. Standard Oil Company of California v. United States (Standard Stations),
337 U.S. 293 (1949), is regularly cited as the authority under which exclusivity
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the arrangement under scrutiny is upheld. If the opposite is
the case, the arrangement is struck down.
Within the framework of the rule of reason, the market
share of the contracting parties is, and has long been, a key
criterion for identifying whether the arrangement at hand is
benign or anti-competitive.21 The importance of the
percentage of the market foreclosed is intuitive: the greater
the share of the market foreclosed, the less alternatives a
competitor (of the party being granted exclusivity) has from
whom she can purchase, or to whom she can sell.22
Consequently, competitors may be driven out of the
market.23 It would thus seem that the competitive danger
raised by exclusivity arrangements increases as the
percentage of the market foreclosed increases. Factors other
arrangements are subject to the rule of reason. See, e.g., Recent Developments,
Tying Agreements and Exclusive Dealing Arrangements before the Courts and the
FTC, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 561, 562 n.15 (1955) [hereinafter Tying and Exclusivity].
Jacobson, supra note 15, at 319, points out that the issue was initially settled
almost a quarter of a century earlier in FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S.
463 (1923). But it should be noted that while the court in Sinclair was
undoubtedly sympathetic to the contract, the contract at bar had not explicitly
prohibited retailers from dealing with competing manufacturers. For an account
of the application of the rule of reason in general, see Richard A. Posner, The Next
Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U.
CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981).
21. See cases cited infra note 25–26.
22. Exclusive dealing arrangements may be exclusive supply agreements,
whereby a seller (or sellers) agrees to supply exclusively to a single purchaser,
and they may be exclusive purchasing agreements, whereby a buyer (or buyers)
agree to purchase exclusively from a single supplier. See Commission Regulation
2790/99 of 22 Dec. 1999 on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to
Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices, art. 1(c), 1999 O.J.
(L 336) 21; Commission Regulation 1984/83 of 22 June 1983 on the Application
of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Exclusive Purchasing Agreements,
1983 O.J. (L 173) 5. Throughout the remainder of this Article, I normally use the
more intuitive example of exclusive purchasing agreements. The argument
pressed in this Article is, however, equally valid in the setting of exclusive supply
agreements.
23. The focus on the disadvantage at which competitors are placed in
comparison to the incumbent as the key element of the analysis follows the
understanding of barriers to entry originating in JOE BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW
COMPETITION (1952). For a discussion of the application of this understanding in
the context of exclusivity, see sources cited infra note 110.
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than the percentage of foreclosure, such as the number of
barriers to entry, are of course also relevant. But the
competitive danger nonetheless largely depends on the
percentage of foreclosure.
Current antitrust theory and law view the competitive
danger associated with exclusivity agreements as a
continuum.24 At one end are exclusivity commitments
granted by firms with trivial market shares, which raise no
real competitive concern. At the other extreme are
exclusivity commitments granted by firms with significant
market shares, which rightly raise concern. This concern
may be outweighed by pro-competitive effects, but it
definitely exists. And the larger the foreclosed share, the
greater the pro-competitive effects that are required to offset
the competitive harm if the agreement is to be upheld.
Approvals of exclusivity arrangements in which the
foreclosed market share is larger than approximately 70%
are essentially nonexistent.25 Courts have emphasized time
and again that such large foreclosure almost invariably
implicates the agreements as anti-competitive.26
24. See infra Part I.
25. See, e.g., Tele Atlas N.V. v. NAVTEQ Corp., 397 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1190
(N.D. Cal. 2005) (dismissing motion for summary judgment, although nothing
but information on the foreclosed market share was alleged to support
competitive harm brought about by exclusives); Fisherman’s Wharf Bay Cruise
Corp. v. Super. Ct. of the City & Cnty. of S.F., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 628, 650 (Ct. App.
2003) (making an even more extreme argument, citing authority for the
proposition that courts “routinely condemn” foreclosure meeting a 50%
threshold); ZF Meritor, L.L.C. v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 263 (3d Cir. 2012)
(dismissing motion for summary judgment); Maxon Hyundai Mazda v. Carfax,
Inc., No. 13-CV-2680 (AJN), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139480, at *269 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 29, 2014).
26. The court in Ryko Manufacturing Co. v. Eden Services, a case upholding
exclusives, indicated that it would have been less sympathetic to the exclusives
had the market share foreclosed been extreme: “Where the degree of foreclosure
caused by the exclusivity provisions is so great that it invariably indicates that
the supplier imposing the provisions has substantial market power, we may rely
on the foreclosure rate alone to establish the violation.” 823 F.2d 1215, 1233 (8th
Cir. 1987). Closely related in the context of the focus on market shares (although
distinct from an economic perspective) are cases in which the firm being granted
exclusivity is a monopoly or holds a significant market share. Such arrangements

2021]

ANTITRUST LAW’S HARM

1103

This Article challenges the prevailing view. It shows that
despite intuition, when exclusivity is granted by a firm or
firms with extremely large market shares, economic theory
suggests that competitive harm is unlikely, and very often
entirely impossible, at least under the main theory of
competitive harm. When the percentage of foreclosure is
relatively small, its anti-competitive potential indeed
increases with the percentage of foreclosure. Foreclosure of
30% is indeed more likely to harm competition than
foreclosure of 20%; foreclosure of 40% is more likely to be
anti-competitive than foreclosure of 30%, and so on. The anticompetitive impact continues to increase as the market share
foreclosed increases, until a threshold of approximately 85%
to 90% is reached. But when the percentage of foreclosure
exceeds this threshold, the positive correlation between the
percentage of foreclosure and the competitive danger no
longer exists. In fact, it is reversed. The large percentage
becomes a safeguard against the use of exclusivity to
enhance or entrench market power.27
This
analysis
has
paradigm-changing
policy
implications. Surprisingly, exclusivity arrangements
resulting in foreclosure of extremely large market shares
should be treated more leniently than arrangements
too are regularly struck down. See United States v. Greenhut (In re Corning), 51
F. 205, 207–08 (N.D. Ohio 1892) )the firm being granted exclusivity was actually
a member of a horizontal combination of several defendants, but a combination
formed prior to the enactment of the Sherman Act); United Shoe Mach. Corp. v.
United States, 258 U.S. 451, 464–65 (1922); Lorain J. Co. v. United States, 342
U.S. 143, 156–57 (1951); FTC v. Motion Pictures Advert. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 392
(1953) (note, however, that the 75% market share was held by four companies,
who all had exclusivity arrangements in place); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT
Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 239–40 (1st Cir. 1983); Omega Env’t, Inc. v.
Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 1997). In the landmark Tampa
Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., subsequently discussed, the court ruled that
market share alone is insufficient as a conclusive indication of competitive harm.
365 U.S. 320, 328 (1961). Consequently, courts generally refer to additional
indicia as well. Nonetheless, despite the rhetoric, the outcome remains the same:
courts essentially never uphold exclusivity arrangements foreclosing large
market shares.
27. The terms “large” and “small” are quantified infra Part 0.
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foreclosing significant (but smaller) market shares.
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows.
Part I briefly reviews the legal treatment of exclusivity. Part
II reviews the potential welfare-enhancing and welfarereducing effects of exclusivity. Specifically, this Part of the
Article offers insight into the key prerequisite for anticompetitive exclusivity under the widely accepted theory of
competitive harm—a collective action problem at the link in
the chain of production granting exclusivity. Part III
develops the concept of “monopoly-over-monopoly status,”
explaining why exclusivity is unlikely to be anti-competitive
when very large market shares are foreclosed. This Part also
provides several useful examples of real-life industries in
which, contrary to common wisdom, exclusivity should be
presumed benign. Part IV derives a practical rule based on
empirical data for US industries. A conclusion follows.
I.

THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF EXCLUSIVITY

Exclusivity arrangements are dealt with under section 1
of the Sherman Act, which prohibits contracts, combinations,
or conspiracies in restraint of trade.28 Additionally, the
Clayton Act,29 enacted in 1914, contains an explicit provision
prohibiting a seller from conditioning sales, prices, discounts
or rebates
on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or
purchaser . . . shall not use or deal in the goods, wares,
merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a
competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of
such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement,
or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend
to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.30

The legal treatment of exclusivity agreements has

28. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (1914).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1914).
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undoubtedly changed over the years since the enactment of
the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. Specifically, the
numerous welfare-enhancing explanations advanced over
the years, which will be surveyed subsequently,31 have
brought about a gradual increase in the minimum threshold
for concern. As will be shown, in the earlier years, even
foreclosure of trivial market shares through exclusivity
arrangements was thought to be concerning. In recent years,
even foreclosure of 50% does not trigger immediate
condemnation. Another change is associated with other
factors of the analysis. Initially, the analysis focused almost
solely on the foreclosed market share. Nowadays, courts
consider additional factors that may impact the effect
exclusivity arrangements have. For example, if barriers to
entry are very low, even relatively large exclusivity raises
less concern.
However, despite the various changes, the percentage of
the market foreclosed to competitors remains a key
determinant of the outcome. It is almost always the starting
point of the analysis, and is often the end of the analysis as
well, specifically when the foreclosed market shares are
extreme. As will be shown, when the market share foreclosed
by exclusivity agreements is extremely small, the
agreements will be upheld almost automatically. When the
market shares foreclosed are extremely large, condemnation
is all but immediate.
The legal treatment of exclusivity agreements can be
roughly divided into three periods—the period between the
enactment of the Sherman Act (1890) and the enactment of
the Clayton Act (1914), the period between the enactment of
the Clayton Act in 1914 and 1961, and the period between
1961 and the present.32
31. See infra Section II.A.
32. Jacobson, supra note 15, at 314–34, identifies four different periods in the
legal treatment of exclusivity agreements. Jacobson divides the third period
discussed below into two different periods—1961 to the 1990s, and the 1990s to
present. I explain below, infra note 76, why I consider these two periods to be
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A. The First Period: 1890 to 1914
The first period began in 1890, with the enactment of the
Sherman Act, and ended in 1914, with the enactment of the
Clayton Act. Between 1890 and 1914, courts refrained
almost completely from interfering with exclusivity
arrangements. With few exceptions, US courts followed the
example set by English courts and upheld exclusivity
arrangements as ‘partial restraints of trade.’33 The most
famous of these cases was the Pullman case,34 in which the
court refused to strike down an agreement granting the
Pullman Company the exclusive right to furnish sleeping
cars for all passenger trains controlled by the Chicago, St.
Louis and New Orleans Railroad Company for a period of 15
years.35 The agreement, which was one of a series of
agreements Pullman had with various railroad companies,36
ultimately enabled Pullman to sustain its monopoly for
nearly a half-century.37 Caselaw throughout this period
neither challenged nor adopted the paradigmatic view that
larger foreclosure always poses greater competitive danger.
Courts had little reason to grapple with the economic
complexities of a practice that was, for all practical purposes,
per se legal. But this period is important in understanding
one.
33. Jacobson, supra note 15, at 314–16.
34. Chi., St. Louis & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Pullman S. Car Co., 139 U.S.
79 (1891).
35. Id. at 83–84.
36. For some of these agreements, see generally Whitwell v. Cont’l Tobacco
Co., 125 F. 454 (8th Cir. 1903); Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U.S. 279 (1905);
Ohio ex. rel. Sheets v. Union Depot Co., 73 N.E. 633 (1905). For a list of additional
state cases, see Jacobson, supra note 15, at 315 nn.15–16.
37. Pullman’s arrangements (the length of which was gradually shortened)
continued to occupy the courts for years later. See, e.g., Eugene V. Rostow, The
New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 567, 588
(1947); William E. Stockhausen, The Commercial and Anti-Trust Aspects of Term
Requirements Contracts, 23 N.Y.U. L. REV. 412, 414 n.7, 420–21, 423–24 (1948);
Jonathan M. Jacobson & Scott A. Sher, “No Economic Sense” Makes No Sense for
Exclusive Dealing, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 779, 779 n.1 (2006).
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the development of antitrust doctrine as it relates to
exclusivity. Naturally, the lack of any in-depth analysis of
the economic effects of the practice also meant that there
were no cases in which a court was forced to grapple with the
possibility that the intuitive view was incorrect. Absent any
challenges to the intuitive view according to which the
competitive harm always increases as the foreclosed market
share increases, this understanding was entrenched.
B. The Second Period: 1914 to 1961
The second period began in 1914, with the enactment of
the Clayton Act. The Clayton Act was aimed at
strengthening antitrust enforcement, which was thought to
be lacking under the Sherman Act.38 Certain practices were
therefore explicitly prohibited. Among these was exclusivity,
which, as mentioned, Section 3 of the Clayton Act condemned
whenever its effect “may be to substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce.”39
Courts were quick to follow the explicit Congressional
condemnation of exclusivity.40 Exclusivity agreements were
soon struck down regardless of the justification offered for
the practice under the specific market settings. The first case
in which the Supreme Court found an agreement to violate
Section 3 of the Clayton Act was the Standard Fashion

38. For a summary of the legislative history of the Clayton Act, see William
B. Lockhart & Howard R. Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors in
Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton
Act, 65 HARV. L. REV. 913, 933–35 (1952). See also Louis B. Schwartz, Potential
Impairment of Competition: The Impact of Standard Oil Co. of California v.
United States on the Standard of Legality Under the Clayton Act, 98 U. PENN. L.
REV. 10 (1949); Tying and Exclusivity, supra note 20, at 562.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1914).
40. The change in the standard of review was noticed almost immediately.
See Notes, The Legality of Contracts of Sale Which Prevent the Purchaser-Retailer
from Handling Goods of the Wholesaler’s Competitors, 30 HARV. L. REV. 72, 73
(1916); see also Jacobson, supra note 15, at 317–23.
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case,41 a ruling subsequently condemned extensively in
academic writings.42 A week later, in United Shoe,43 the
Court struck down exclusivity clauses it had upheld twice in
the preceding decade under the Sherman Act.44 In both
cases, the Court seemed to apply a rule of per se illegality to
the practice, as it conducted no analysis of the effects of the
exclusivity commitment on market performance.45 But
shortly thereafter, in Sinclair,46 the Court clarified that the
practice was not subject to per se condemnation. Following
this clarification, lower courts began focusing on the market
shares of the contracting parties, striking down exclusivity
clauses that resulted in foreclosure of significant market
shares, and upholding exclusivity arrangements signed by
firms with insignificant market shares.47 Once again, the
intuitive linkage between the foreclosed market share and
the effect on competition was not questioned in any way. The
courts subscribed to the same basic logic: the larger the
foreclosed market share, the greater the competitive danger.

41. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane Hous. Co., 258 U.S. 346, 357 (1922).
The appeal to the Supreme Court was the culmination of lengthy litigation, in
the course of which lower courts repeatedly found the arrangement to be in
violation of Section 3 of the Clayton Act. See Standard Fashion Co. v. MagraneHous. Co., 254 F. 493, 500 (D. Mass. 1918); Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane
Hous. Co., 251 F. 559 (1st Cir. 1918); Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane Hous.
Co., 259 F. 793, 795 (1st Cir. 1919).
42. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 11, at 305–07; Frank G. Mathewson & Ralph
A. Winter, The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements: Comment, 77 AM.
ECON. REV. 1057, 1057 (1987). But see Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones,
Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 422, 441–43
(1965).
43. United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 465 (1922).
44. Cf. United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202, 217 (1913) (technically
considering only the agreement forming United Shoe Machinery, not the
exclusivity covenant); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32, 65
(1918) (which, although decided after the enactment of the Clayton Act, pertained
to offenses that had been committed prior to its enactment).
45. See Jacobson, supra note 15, at 318–19.
46. FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463, 474–75 (1923).
47. Jacobson, supra note 15, at 319–320 & nn.52–54.
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Approximately a quarter-century later, the legality of
exclusivity arrangements was again questioned, due to a
ruling that applied a per se illegality rule to tie-in
arrangements.48 As both tie-ins and exclusivity are governed
by Section 3 of the Clayton Act, the ruling finding tie-ins to
be per se illegal could have been interpreted to apply to
exclusivity as well, or at least could have affected the legal
treatment of exclusivity.49 The Supreme Court was again
called upon to decide on the rule applicable to exclusivity. In
the landmark Standard Stations case, the Court reaffirmed
that exclusivity arrangements, as opposed to tying
arrangements, were not to be judged under the per se
illegality rule.50 However, complex economic investigations
would not be required: exclusivity arrangements foreclosing
“a substantial share of the line of commerce affected” would
be condemned under Section 3 of the Clayton Act.51 The term
“substantial share” was interpreted to mean any share that
was nontrivial. Even foreclosure of relatively small market
shares was enough for striking down an agreement.52
48. Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947) (subsequently
limited to a certain extent in Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 35
(1984)).
49. See, e.g., Tying and Exclusivity, supra note 20, at 561–62, 561–62 nn.13–
15.
50. Standard Oil Co. v. United States (Standard Stations), 337 U.S. 293, 314–
15 (1949).
51. Id. at 314; see also United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280,
286–87 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aff’d, 343 U.S. 922 (1952) (affirming case with same
issues as Standard Stations); Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457,
465 (1941). The Court’s reasoning in International Salt suggests the same,
although the case at bar was one of tie-ins, not of exclusivity. 332 U.S. at 396. For
a discussion of the analogy between the legal treatment of both practices, see
Schwartz, supra note 38, at 11–12.
52. See, e.g., Standard Stations, 337 U.S. at 304–05, 314. See generally Tying
and Exclusivity, supra note 20, at 561–62. Although the quote refers directly to
tying arrangements, the author clarifies that this account holds relevant to the
analysis of exclusivity agreements. But later in the article a more nuanced
approach to exclusivity arrangements is identified. See id. at 563. A different
interpretation of the cases (as conforming to the notion of “workable competition”)
can be found in Alfred E. Kahn, The Legal and Economic Appraisal of the “New”
Sherman and Clayton Acts, 63 YALE L.J. 293, 313–15, 319–22 (1954). Kahn
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The “substantial foreclosure” test, or the quantitative
substantiality test,53 was subsequently adopted as the test to
be applied for scrutiny under the Sherman Act prohibitions
as well.54 Blake and Jones, summarizing the case law at the
time, pointed out: “It might be argued that exclusive dealing
arrangements have compensating advantages . . . . This is a
good basis for upholding exclusive dealing arrangements
when they do not threaten to impede entry . . . .”55
acknowledges, however, that although the decisions can be explained by the
“workable competition” idea, the actual reasoning of the courts suggests that any
foreclosure of a “not insubstantial” market share is enough for condemnation. See
id. at 314–15.
53. Jacobson, supra note 15, at 320.
54. For examples of cases applying the test to the Sherman Act provisions,
see Lorain J. Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 153–54 (1951) (Sherman Act
section 2); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321 (1966) (Sherman Act section
1); Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 at 286–87 (Sherman Act section 1 (but not
section 2) and Clayton Act section 3 with respect to the relevance of intent); FTC
v. Motion Pictures Advert. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 395, 397–98 (technically discussing
the Federal Trade Commission Act section 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45, but stipulating that
the contracts were in violation of both the monopolization offenses and the
restraint of trade provisions of the Sherman Act); Barry Wright Corp v. ITT
Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 230, 236 (1st Cir. 1983) (Sherman Act sections 1
and 2 and Clayton Act section 3); Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215,
1233 (8th Cir. 1987) (although the court did suggest that the prohibition in
Clayton Act section 3 is broader). This was a change in the understanding of the
statutes. They were originally perceived as applying different standards of
liability, which, as mentioned, were in fact the raison d’etre of the Clayton Act.
See United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 459–60 (1922);
William Noel Keyes, Exclusive Foreign Distributor Agreements—Are They
Illegal?, 41 CAL. L. REV. 439, 443 (1953). For later cases applying a different
standard of review, see McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d
332, 339 (4th Cir. 1959) (“All that the plaintiffs have done is to apply the Sherman
law label to the same facts which they charge constituted a Clayton Act
transgression.”); Am. Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1250
(3d Cir. 1975) (stipulating that analysis under Clayton Act section 3 is more
stringent than under the Sherman Act). For a recent account of the possibility of
different standards under the different applicable sections, see Jacobson & Sher,
supra note 37, at 779–81.
55. Blake & Jones, supra note 42, at 445–46 (emphasis added). Interestingly,
the authors claim that this is what the court did in Tampa Electric Co. v.
Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961), as well. But subsequent writings view
Tampa Electric as the cornerstone of the full-blown rule of reason analysis, that
calls for a balance of pro- and anti- competitive effects. Although a similar
outcome may have been reached under the then-prevailing approach, as market
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By the end of the second period, in 1961, it was well
established that exclusivity arrangements foreclosing a
substantial market share, taken to mean any nontrivial
market share, were illegal regardless of whether they were
challenged under the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act. Only
exclusivity agreements foreclosing insignificant market
shares were upheld. Once again, the axiom by which there is
a positive correlation between the foreclosed market share
and the competitive danger posed by exclusivity was not in
any way challenged.
C. The Third Period: 1961 to Present
The Tampa Electric ruling, delivered in 1961,56 marks
the beginning of the third period.57 In Tampa Electric, the
shares in Tampa Electric were indeed not extremely significant, the case
nonetheless marks the advent of a different approach.
56. Tampa Elec. Co., 365 U.S. at 320.
57. Jacobson classifies Tampa Electric as part of the second period, and the
FTC’s decision in Beltone as the case marking the beginning of the third period.
Jacobson, supra note 15, at 322–23 (citing In re Beltone Elecs. Corp., 100 F.T.C.
68 (1982)), rejecting the traditional classification according to which Tampa
Electric marks the beginning of the full-blown rule of reason analysis. See, e.g.,
Richard M. Steuer, Exclusive Dealing in Distribution, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 101,
107–08 (1983); Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir.
1984). I prefer the traditional classification to Jacobson’s, because cases following
Tampa Electric, although undoubtedly placing great weight on the substantiality
of foreclosure, were generally careful to apply a more comprehensive analysis of
the effects of exclusivity even before Beltone. See, e.g., Bob Maxfield, Inc. v. Am.
Motors Corp., 637 F.2d 1033, 1036 (5th Cir. 1981); Am. Motor Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d
at 1252; Magnus Petroleum Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 599 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1979);
see also cases cited infra note 65 (but note that Barry Wright Corp. was decided
shortly after Beltone). And cases of insignificant foreclosure were routinely
upheld. See references in Jacobson, supra note 15, at 323 n.77. In fact, at least
the shift in the Commission’s view actually preceded Tampa Electric. As early as
1955 it was observed that “the Commission has adopted a less restrictive
approach to exclusive dealing arrangements and tie-ins. It vigorously rejects the
contention that they are illegal per se, and requires the hearing examiner to hear
evidence offered by the defendant that after the agreement was made, the
number of competitors and the total volume of their business increased, and that
defendant’s share of the market decreased. The FTC is thus apparently
committed to the theory that proof of dominance or substantial volume is not
sufficient to void the agreement if it is shown that there is no deleterious effect
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Court emphasized that:
[t]o determine substantiality in a given case, it is necessary to weigh
the probable effect of the contract on the relevant area of effective
competition, taking into account the relative strength of the parties,
the proportionate volume of commerce involved in relation to the
total volume of commerce in the relevant market area, and the
probable immediate and future effects which preemption of that
share of the market might have on effective competition therein. It
follows that a mere showing that the contract itself involves a
substantial number of dollars is ordinarily of little consequence.58

Tampa Electric is a paradigm-changing case. It shifted
the analysis from a one-dimensional focus on market shares,
to a comprehensive analysis incorporating an account of
barriers to entry, competitors’ expected responses, the
duration of the agreement, and additional factors. However,
despite this important shift, the Court in Tampa Electric did
not stipulate that market share was of no importance. Quite
the contrary: The foreclosed market share is explicitly
mentioned as a key determinant of the competitive danger
associated with exclusivity agreements,59 and therefore as a
factor which must be considered in all cases. And within this
element, the Court subscribed to the widespread view that
the greater the foreclosed market share,60 the greater the
competitive harm.
on competition.” Tying and Exclusivity, supra note 20, at 563. For such decisions,
see id. at 563 n.23. See also Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the
Future: Trade Regulation, 51 NW. L. REV. 281, 290 (1956); United States v.
Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948) (which—although technically analyzing
a vertical merger and not an exclusivity arrangement—considered the foreclosing
effect in a section 1 and section 2 analysis and was later relied on in Tampa
Electric itself). Even according to Jacobson, Tampa Electric’s reasoning is the
foundation of the shift in focus during the third period. See Jacobson, supra note
15, at 323–27.
58. 365 U.S. at 329 (emphasis added).
59. See also id. at 328 (where the foreclosed share of the market is mentioned
as part of the three-stage test that must be conducted before competitive harm
can be found).
60. In the Court’s wording, the “proportionate volume of commerce involved
in relation to the total volume of commerce in the relevant market area.” Id. at
329.
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Tampa Electric did not result in an immediate shift to a
full-blown rule of reason analysis. Courts’ focus on market
share was not abandoned. Tampa Electric’s immediate effect
was to alter lower courts’ perception of what level of
foreclosure constituted innocuous foreclosure. The
percentage of foreclosure at which exclusivity agreements
were condemned was steadily raised, and higher and higher
levels of foreclosure were tolerated. When Tampa Electric
was handed down, even foreclosure of 6% of the relevant
market was considered enough for condemnation,61 and in
one extreme case foreclosure of 1.6% of the relevant market
resulted in condemnation.62 Gradually, a 30% to 40% market
share became the threshold for condemnation,63 and some
later courts even applied a 45% to 50% threshold.64
Tampa Electric’s less immediate effect was on the
hegemony of market shares in the competitive analysis of
exclusivity agreements. Gradually, the myopic focus on
market share alone was abandoned. Courts eventually began
considering additional factors as well.65 In Roland

61. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States (Standard Stations), 337 U.S. 293
(1949) (although concern was also expressed with similar practices by other
dominant firms).
62. The most extensively criticized of the rulings that condemned foreclosure
of small market shares is Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
While the case was technically a case of a vertical merger, not an exclusivity
agreement, the concern was of foreclosure, and the analysis was “consistent with
prior precedent.” Blake & Jones, supra note 42, at 454; see generally id. at 453–
56. For an account of the different rulings in different contexts see Kahn, supra
note 52, at 315–322.
63. HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 435–37; Omega Env’t, Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc.,
127 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1997). For an account of the development, see Jacobson,
supra note 15, at 323–25, 327–28. For a brief account of the state of the law in
the early 1990s, when the threshold was between 25% and 40%, see HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE 398–99 (1st ed. 1994).
64. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000), cert.
denied, 122 S. Ct. 350 (2001); see also infra note 148.
65. See, e.g., Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir.
1983); Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); Sulmeyer v. CocaCola Co., 515 F.2d 835 (1975) (considering, inter alia, the question of de facto
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Machinery,66 the Seventh Circuit upheld an exclusivity
arrangement67 because the plaintiff had not offered proof of
a probable anti-competitive effect.68 In Ryko,69 the Eighth
Circuit took note of the level of distribution that was
foreclosed and the duration and scope of the agreements, and
refused to condemn the arrangement.70 In New York News,71
a district judge upheld exclusivity agreements which
undoubtedly covered a significant market share (although
the precise share was not pinpointed, mainly due to
plaintiffs’ failure to adequately define the market),72
because, inter alia, there had been “no showing that
interbrand competition ha[d] been significantly limited or
that entrance into the newspaper publishing market ha[d]
been foreclosed.”73 In Paddock Publications, Judge
Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit emphasized that
competition for exclusives was in itself a form of competition
exclusivity and finding the jury’s conclusion of no exclusionary effect
sustainable); Joyce Beverages v Royal Crown Cola Co., 555 F. Supp. 271
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). For a survey of recent cases and courts’ focus on actual effects,
see Jacobson & Sher, supra note 37, at 793–98. In some cases, indicia other than
market share were considered as a substitute for market share, especially when
market share had not been proven. But in several cases, additional factors were
considered alongside market share.
66. Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984).
67. I use the term “arrangement” and not “agreement” intentionally, because
the court grappled with the question of whether an actual agreement existed. But
the court’s conclusion is not based on the distinction. Id. at 393 (“Actually, it is
not important whether Dresser’s antipathy to nonexclusive dealing was secret.”).
68. A demonstration of such a probability requires proof of two issues: One is
that at least one significant competitor is likely to be kept out of the market due
to the exclusives. The other is that the result of this exclusion is likely to be a
raise in prices above the competitive level. Id. at 394.
69. Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215 (8th Cir. 1987).
70. See id. at 1234–35.
71. See Bowen v. N.Y. News, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
72. See id. at 678.
73. Id. at 679. This was only one reason for rejecting the argument. The main
argument for rejecting the plaintiffs’ contention was that they lacked standing to
sue. See id. at 677–78. As previously noted, the court also pointed out that the
plaintiffs had failed to adequately define the market. See id. at 678.
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to be protected by antitrust laws,74 even though the end
result—a large market share unavailable to competitors due
to a series of exclusivity agreements—may seem like a
foreclosed market.
In Omega,75 a case in the Ninth Circuit, a dominant
producer, Gilbarco, refused to deal with Omega, a distributor
who would not deal exclusively with Gilbarco. Gilbarco was
the market leader, with a 55% market share, and its policy
of refusing to deal with distributors who were not exclusive
to its brand foreclosed 38% of the market. The circuit court
emphasized the availability of alternative distribution
channels, the short duration of the exclusivity contract, and
the ease with which the exclusivity contract could be
terminated. It consequently refused to strike down the
agreement.
At least since Omega:
[C]ourts, for the most part, have demanded rigorous proof of the
relevant market in which market power is assessed; have required
plaintiffs to distinguish exclusive dealing contracts won through
aggressive competition from those that are profitable only because
of their negative effect on rivals; and have given extended
consideration to proffered efficiency justifications. The focus on true
market power in these cases is not attributable to a concern that
market power in the abstract, unrelated to the challenged conduct,
is harmful (although that is often true). The concern is instead that
creating or increasing market power through exclusive dealing is
the means by which the defendant is likely to increase prices,
restrict output, reduce quality, slow innovation, or otherwise harm
consumers.76

74. See Paddock Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chi. Trib. Co., 103 F.3d 42, 45 (7th Cir. 1996).
However, competition for exclusives may also be anti-competitive, as
demonstrated by the Canadian Nielsen case. See Dir. of Investigation & Rsch. v.
D&B Cos. of Can. Ltd. (Nielsen) [1995] C.C.T.D. No. 20, 64 C.P.R. (3d) 216 (Can.
Ont. C.C.T.D.); see also Michal S. Gal, The Nielsen Case: Was Competition
Restored? On the Anti-Competitive Effects of a Partial Enforcement of Competition
Laws, 29 CAN. BUS. L.J. 17, 18 (1998).
75. See Omega Env’t, Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1997).
76. Jacobson, supra note 15, at 328. Jacobson considers Omega to be the
inception of a fourth period, in which courts are firmly committed to a full-blown
rule of reason analysis. Id. I do not challenge Jacobson’s point, but as the
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The most famous exclusivity case in recent years is the
Microsoft case,77 in which the Second Circuit engaged in an
elaborate analysis of the effect that a series of arrangements
between Microsoft and independent entities had on
Netscape’s ability to compete effectively in the Internet
Browser market. Emphasis was placed not only on the share
of the foreclosed distribution outlets, but also on the relative
efficacy of these outlets. The circuit court was willing to
condemn exclusivity arrangements even when the 40% to
50% foreclosure threshold usually required was not met.78
Other cases also demonstrate an emphasis on the real effect
of the arrangements on market structure and performance.79
But despite the shift to a full-blown rule of reason
analysis, market share remains the key element of the
analysis. As the district court in Visa pointed out, “[E]ven
after Tampa Elec., the degree to which an agreement
forecloses the market remains arguably the most important

preceding survey shows, the courts’ commitment to a rule of reason analysis can
be found in quite a few rulings that preceded Omega (although the rule of reason
was less developed in the early days of this period). As Judge Posner wrote in
1984 in Roland Machinery: “Although the Supreme Court has not decided an
exclusive-dealing case in many years, it now appears most unlikely that such
agreements, whether challenged under section 3 of the Clayton Act or section 1
of the Sherman Act, will be judged by the simple and strict test of Standard
Stations. They will be judged under the Rule of Reason, and thus condemned only
if found to restrain trade unreasonably.” Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc.,
749 F.2d 380, 393 (7th Cir. 1984). Omega is thus, for current purposes, one point
in the long period beginning in Tampa Electric, which resulted in a gradual shift
from a technical focus on the substantiality of foreclosure to a full-blown rule of
reason.
77. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (2d Cir. 2000).
78. See id. at 35, 46, 52–53.
79. See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp. v. Acco Brands, Inc., No. CV99–
1877DT(MCX), 2000 WL 986995, at *26 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2000) (discussing
barriers to entry, even though the defendant had a 75% market share, and
concluding that there was a likelihood of consumer harm); Louisa Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 804, 815–16 (E.D.
Ky. 1999) (concluding that the harm to the competitor was the result of hard
competition, not of harm to competition itself); United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc.,
163 F. Supp. 2d 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003).
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factor in determining whether the agreement violates § 1.”80
Within the framework of the market share analysis, the idea
that the competitive harm is always positively correlated to
the foreclosed market share at all levels of foreclosure is still
prevalent.
One immediate effect of this paradigm is that despite the
courts’ rhetoric, exclusivity arrangements foreclosing large
market shares are practically never upheld.81 However, the
number of exclusivity agreements actually struck down by
courts greatly understates the effect of this paradigm. The
prevailing paradigm has a much greater effect than a simple
review of the case law may suggest. An extremely important
effect of the rule is its effect on those agreements that are not
reached for fear of condemnation. This is an unobservable
effect because by definition it can only be measured by the
number of agreements that are not struck due to the
applicable rule (or that are concealed for fear of
condemnation). However, there is good reason to think that
this effect is significant. First, it can generally be assumed
that business entities, through their officers and legal
advisors, are well aware of the prevailing view on exclusivity
arrangements and of the state of the law.82 Second, this is
even more likely given that, in this respect, the application

80. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Visa U.S.A., No. 04
Civ.8967(BSJ), 2005 WL 1515399, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2005).
81. This does not change whether the analysis is conducted within the
framework of the Clayton Act section 3, or the Sherman Act section 1 and section
2. Although the Clayton Act section 3 was originally intended to apply a stricter
standard than the Sherman Act, analysis under the Acts eventually converged.
See cases cited supra note 25 and accompanying text.
82. The idea that through legal advice economic actors conduct themselves
with the correct legal outcome in mind is not novel in any way. In fact, even in
settings in which we do not expect laypersons to be versed in any way, such as
litigation, the assumption is normally that decisions are informed by the expected
application of the legal rule. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial:
A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal
Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982). In the specific context of antitrust law, see
CrimA 7829/03 State of Israel v. Ariel Elec. Eng’g Traffic Lights & Control Ltd.,
60(2) PD 120 (2005) (Isr.).
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of the law has not changed for over a full century, at least
since the enactment of the Clayton Act. A business entity
considering signing exclusivity arrangements resulting in
foreclosure of large market shares would be cautioned by any
attorney it consulted that its exclusivity clauses would likely
be unenforceable.
Thus, if the paradigm is erroneous—which, as
subsequently explained, it is—its effect on competition is
difficult to measure, but nonetheless crystal clear. An
infinite number of arrangements foreclosing extreme market
shares are simply not struck for fear of condemnation.
Disallowing perfectly benign exclusivity arrangements is
itself a social cost. It is socially undesirable to steer parties
away from their preferred (harmless) business arrangement,
and force them to settle for the second best alternative, or to
conceal the contracts (and risk sanctions). This is certainly
the case when it is clear that exclusivity arrangements can
achieve a host of welfare-enhancing goals, as will be
subsequently shown.
The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that the
prohibition on exclusivity encompasses not just exclusivity
that takes the form of an explicit contractual commitment
not to deal with competitors. Section 3 of the Clayton Act,
and sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act all apply to
agreements that include some kind of financial inducement
to exclusivity, even if dealing with competitors is not
nominally prohibited.83 Thus, for example, loyalty discounts
and rebate systems that induce de facto exclusivity are also
under the purview of the antitrust prohibitions.84 Similarly,
an agreement for the employment of technological measures
that will make a competitor’s product less accessible may

83. With respect to section 3 of the Clayton Act, this is explicit in the language
of the Act itself. See Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 3, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (current version
at 15 U.S.C. § 14).
84. See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); Lockhart
& Sacks, supra note 38, at 919–20.
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also be prohibited by antitrust laws.85 Each of these may be
done for pro-competitive reasons. For example, the
employment of technological measures may serve to protect
sensitive systems from being compromised.86 But business
entities know that if a side effect of such a system—whether
or not intended—is to foreclose a significant portion of the
market to competitors, it will not be upheld. They thus have
good reason to refrain from introducing such technologies. If
firms are steered away from what is otherwise their
preferred course of action, the condemnation of large
foreclosure has additional grave effects which are not
captured by a mere survey of the case law.
Against this backdrop, it is helpful to review the host of
welfare-enhancing goals that exclusivity may achieve, so as
to understand the scope of what antitrust law may be
wrongfully
preventing.
Subsequently,
the
anticompetitiveness of exclusivity will be analyzed in detail, in
order to understand why anti-competitive foreclosure of
extremely large market shares is unlikely, and at times
impossible even on a completely theoretical level.
II. THE WELFARE-ENHANCING AND WELFARE-REDUCING
EFFECTS OF EXCLUSIVITY
Against the backdrop of the current state of the law that
generally condemns exclusivity agreements whenever they
foreclose a very large market share to competitors, it is
helpful to review the welfare-enhancing and welfarereducing effects of exclusivity. Subsequently, the
prerequisites for anti-competitive exclusivity will be
scrutinized in greater detail to show why the intuitive link
between large foreclosure and harm to competition must be
severed.

85. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (2d Cir. 2000).
86. See Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Agreements and the Leverage Problem,
67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957) (in the specific context of tying arrangements).

1120

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

A. Welfare-Enhancing Effects
Exclusivity agreements may achieve a host of welfareenhancing goals.87
First, exclusivity reduces the parties’ uncertainty.
Specifically, parties can use these agreements to insulate
themselves from fluctuations in price and quantity. This may
be extremely important if there are sunk costs that are
specific to the relationship. There are a host of circumstances
in which a party to an agreement must make significant
relationship-specific investments. Examples may be
adapting a plant to produce a product that is compatible with
the purchaser’s needs, purchasing packing and labeling
machinery that conforms to the purchaser’s requirements,
and so on. If the party required to make these relationshipspecific investments is not guaranteed a certain amount of
sales for a predetermined price, the investments may be
abandoned. Exclusivity arrangements shielding the
investing party from fluctuations in price may thus be
essential to facilitate the investment in the first place.88 The

87. See generally Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 614 F.3d
57 (3d Cir. 2010).
88. See, e.g., Stockhausen, supra note 3737, at 413–15; Blake & Jones, supra
note 4242, at 440 (discussing full vertical integration, where this advantage is
more pronounced); Schwartz, supra note 38, at 12 (focusing on a variation of this
explanation: “a constant supply of goods at a definite price without the financial
burden of a large inventory”); Mark Q Connelly, Exclusive Dealing and Tied
Selling under the Amended Combines Investigation Act, 14 OSGOODE HALL L.J.
521, 528 (1976) (offering a very close variation of the argument: “[due to a]
continuous supply even in times of shortage . . . dealers are relieved of the need
to carry large inventories”). An element of this explanation that is sometimes
overlooked is the ostensible inadequacy of exclusivity alone to achieve stability.
In fact, exclusivity may seem counter-productive in this scenario. If the
purchasers’ total demand falls for some reason, the seller will not have sold the
minimum number of units it needs to sell. On the other hand, if demand
increases, the seller will need to increase production so as to meet the increased
demand, perhaps to a point at which production is unprofitable. See generally
DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
35–44 (4th ed. 2005). At times, the seller may even be unable to supply all of the
buyers’ demand. Ostensibly, therefore, exclusivity is a cumbersome way of
reducing volatility. A long-term contract stipulating price and quantity for the
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Tampa Electric case previously mentioned89 demonstrates
this neatly. In Tampa Electric, a public utility decided to try
to use coal instead of oil as boiler fuel in two generating units
of a new plant. Naturally, this required significant
adaptations of the production process. As per the Court,
Tampa Electric, the public utility, expended nearly USD $30
million (in 2020 terms) in excess of what it would have
expended on oil-burning units.90 Similarly, Tampa’s
contractual counterpart, Nashville Coal, expended
approximately USD $70 million (in 2020 terms) in preparing
to perform the contract. Any change in the price of coal would
have had a dramatic impact on both parties’ cost-benefit
analysis, making profitability extremely volatile. The
exclusivity arrangement, in which Tampa Electric
committed to purchase all its coal-requirements for a period
of twenty years, assured both parties that their investment
would not be in vein. The exclusivity commitment was
apparently essential to facilitate deal-specific investments
duration of the contract is both straightforward and more effective in reducing
volatility. See also PHILIP AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT,
AND CASES 654–55 (6th ed. 2004) (discussing that the problem of fluctuations in
buyers’ demand is implicitly dealt with, when the authors describe the setting as
one in which users have “fairly stable requirements”; the problem explicitly
addressed by the authors is closely related to the one described here); Victor P.
Goldberg & John R. Erickson, Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-term
Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke, 30 J.L. & ECON. 369 (1987);
Stockhausen, supra note 37, at 412 (“[T]he amount remains indefinite and in fact
may be zero.”). However, in real-life settings, exclusivity may be a workable proxy
for specified quantities, although the seller may prefer a firm commitment to
specified prices and quantities, and although such agreements are sometimes
struck. See, e.g., Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir.
1983); Magnus Petroleum Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 599 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1979).
Buyers may be reluctant to make such a commitment because they themselves
do not know, at the time the contract is struck, the precise quantities they will
need. Thus, they may be more inclined to commit to purchasing all of their
demand from the seller than to commit to purchasing a fixed number of units,
especially when the contract is of greater length. On the seller’s side, although
this guarantee may be less appealing than a firm commitment, it is nonetheless
of value, specifically if buyers’ demand is relatively stable. See AREEDA ET AL.,
supra note 88, at 654; Stockhausen, supra note 37, at 414.
89. See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
90. See id. at 323.
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totaling nearly USD $100,000,000 (in 2020 terms).91
A second, closely-related, advantage of exclusivity is that
it prevents the “hold up” problem.92 Even ignoring volatility,
and even assuming that investments are initially justified
even absent exclusivity, once a party has made deal-specific
commitments, its contractual counterpart may try to take
advantage of these deal-specific investments to extract a
better deal than negotiated. Knowing this ex ante, the party
that is supposed to make the investment will refrain from
making it. Exclusivity is an “efficient contractual guarantee
against the hold-up problem,”93 without which “the product
might not be developed at all, and, at the very least,
investment in product-specific assets . . . would be
reduced.”94
Exclusivity also eliminates free riding, which may occur
when a manufacturer’s competitors can enjoy the benefits of
the manufacturer’s investments,95 be they investments in
the brand and the like, or the funding of retail-level
services.96 If a manufacturer invests in increasing demand
for its own brand, for example through advertising,
consumers will be attracted to retailers who carry the brand
by virtue of the manufacturer’s investment. If these retailers

91. See also MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK ET
CANADIAN COMPETITION POLICY 540 (2002).
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92. See RICHARD WHISH & DAVID BAILEY, COMPETITION LAW 665–66 (8th ed.
2015).
93. TREBILCOCK ET AL., supra note 91, at 628.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 461; WHISH & BAILEY, supra note 92, at 665 (“A free-rider problem
can arise where a supplier invests in promotion at a retailer’s premises which a
competing supplier takes advantage of: a non-compete provision may be justified
to prevent this type of free-riding.”).
96. For examples of different ways in which the manufacturer may incur the
costs of these services, see Martin B. Glauser Dodge Co. v Chrysler Corp., 570
F.2d 72, 76–77 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 US 913 (1978); Coleman Motor
Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338, 1341–42 (3d Cir. 1975); Mount Lebanon
Motors v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp. 453, 457 (W.D. Pa. 1968); see also Russell
Stover Candies, Inc., 100 F.T.C. 1, 52 (1982) (Comm’r Miller, dissenting).
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also carry competing brands that are sold for a lower price
(as they do not need to cover the costs of advertisement),
consumers may ultimately purchase these competing brands
rather than the brand that they were originally searching
for. A retailer may intentionally use the advertised brand to
lure consumers and offer them a competing brand for a lower
price.97 This may also simply be a result of the availability of
the less-expensive brand. Regardless of the retailer’s
motivation, this essentially allows competing manufacturers
to free ride on the manufacturer’s investment. Similarly, a
manufacturer may be willing to fund retail-level services, for
example by offering training for sale personnel.98 But if
competing manufacturers free ride on these services,
manufacturers will be unwilling to fund or provide them.99
Free riding on services is a real issue. According to a recent
inquiry conducted by the European Commission, nearly half
of all manufacturers and retailers believe free-riding to be

97. Note that this is different from ‘bait and switch selling’ prohibited under
Section 74.04 of the Canadian Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-34.
98. A closely related question is why retailers—who accrue the additional
profits from the sale of all brands—will not spontaneously provide the services,
obviating the need for remuneration in the first place. But retailers’ profitmargin, or their return on the investment, may be different from the
manufacturer’s, thus making the investment unprofitable from their perspective.
Additionally, retailers face an analogous free-riding problem, known as the intrabrand free riding problem. The intra-brand free rider problem may be overcome
with the reverse exclusivity provision, namely exclusive supply, whereby the
manufacturer commits to selling exclusively to a single (service providing)
retailer. Intra-brand free riding can also be overcome by assigning exclusive
territories to retailers or—according to traditional antitrust analysis—by
imposing a price minimum on retailers. See Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The
Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 825
(1955); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Resale Price Maintenance—A Monopoly Problem,
25 J. BUS. U. CHI. 141, 151 (1952); Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers
Want Fair Trade, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960); Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc.
v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). On the incentive alignment when profit
margins are different, see Benjamin Klein & Joshua D. Wright, The Economics
of Slotting Contracts, 50 J.L. & ECON 421 (2007).
99. Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Report from the
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Final report on the Ecommerce Sector Inquiry, para. 46 n.51, COM (2017) 229 final (May 10, 2017).
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common or very common.100 Manufacturers can eliminate
this problem by demanding that retailers who receive these
services remain exclusive to them.101 Exclusivity can thus
facilitate investment in product distribution.102
A fourth welfare-enhancing function exclusivity may
accomplish is the inducement of retail-level selling efforts.103
Exclusivity agreements link the fates of retailers to that of
manufacturers. If a retailer carries several brands, it is
relatively indifferent to the success of any specific brand. By
contrast, if a retailer’s success is contingent on the success of
the specific brand, as it is when the retailer carries that
brand exclusively, the retailer is motivated to promote the

100. Id. paras. 312–323.
101. Id. para. 48. For real-life examples, see Case T–88/92, Groupement
d’Achat Édouard Leclerc v. Comm’n, 1996 E.C.R. II-196, ¶¶ 94–96, and Case T–
87/92, BVBA Kruidvat v. Comm’n, 1996 ECR II-1931, ¶ 45 (both cases raise this
argument with regards to selective distribution contracts of cosmetics); Pictorial
Rev. Co. v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 255 F. 206, 206–08 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (describing the
defendant’s investment in the distribution system); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
Int’l Parts Corp., 376 F.2d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 1967) (enumerating the benefits the
plaintiff got from carrying the brand); see also Steuer, supra note 57, at 114–16.
102. Howard P. Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 25 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1982); Ryko Mfg.
Co. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215 (8th Cir. 1987); Dennis Waelbroeck, Vertical
Agreements: 4 Years of Liberalisation by Regulation n. 2790/99 After 40 Years of
Legal (Block) Regulation, in THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW 85,
100–01 (Hanns Ullrich ed., 2006); Stanley I. Ornstein, Exclusive Dealing and
Antitrust, 34 ANTITRUST BULL. 65, 69–70, 74–76 (1989); Notice of the EFTA
Surveillance Authority on the “Guidelines on Vertical Restraints,” 2012 O.J. (C
362) 1, paras. 106–08 [hereinafter EFTA].
103. See A. Douglas Melamed, Thoughts About Exclusive Dealing, in
EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL: 2007, at 433, 434 (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann
& Mel Marquis eds., 2008); Benjamin Klein, Exclusive Dealing as Competition
For Distribution “On The Merits”, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 119, 137–60 (2003);
Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Exclusive Dealing Intensifies Competition
for Distribution, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 433 (2008); Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 38,
at 921–22; Keyes, supra note 54, at 441. A prominent real-life example of this use
of exclusivity can be found in Joyce Beverages v. Royal Crown Cola. 555 F. Supp.
271, 273–74 (S.D.N.Y. 1983);see also BORK, supra note 11, at 306–307; AREEDA ET
AL., supra note 88, at 655 (pointing to some concern with the possible divergence
between the manufacturer’s interest and the social interest, but pointing to two
cases in which the pro-competitive benefits of exclusivity seem the strongest).
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brand and ensure its success.104 Theoretically, these services
may be contracted for, but perfect contracts are extremely
difficult to write, and enforcement is always costly,
specifically when the contract seeks to ensure unquantifiable
elements, such as zeal, politeness, etc. Exclusivity ties the
retailer’s fate to that of the manufacturer’s, thereby
guaranteeing that the retailer will be incentivized to perform
retail-level services to the best of its ability. Exclusivity may
thus function as an enforcement mechanism that aligns the
parties’ respective interests in a manner that is less costly
than a contract that does the same, even if a contract is a
feasible option.105
A fifth advantage of exclusivity arrangements is that
they may help manufacturers verify that products have
originated with them. This may be especially important
when manufacturers assume post-sale duties vis-à-vis end
consumers, such as warranties, maintenance, or service. Of
course, other mechanisms such as barcodes and the like may
be useful in verifying the origin of the product, but
exclusivity may function as one such mechanism. Any
product purchased from the specific retailer is guaranteed to
have originated from the manufacturer. Closely related,
exclusivity may also serve to ensure consumers of the origin
of the product. If the manufacturer’s brand commands a
premium over other brands, consumers may require
assurances that they are receiving the manufacturer’s brand
in return for their additional expenditure. Exclusivity may
be a way to ensure consumers that the product they are
purchasing originates from the manufacturer.106
104. This commitment is of value even if the manufacturer is not concerned
with inter-brand free riding. See Joyce Beverages, 555 F. Supp. at 273–76;
Sulmeyer v. Coca-Cola Co., 515 F.2d 835, 841, 847 (5th Cir. 1975); Steuer, supra
note 57, at 124–26; Marvel, supra note 102, at 2, 4–5 (arguing that this is not a
viable explanation for exclusivity).
105. For a similar analysis of resale price maintenance, see Benjamin Klein &
Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms, 31
J.L. & ECON 265 (1988).
106. Steuer, supra note 57, at 131–32; Ornstein, supra note 102, at 75–76;
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Finally, exclusivity can reduce parties’ transaction costs.
While on-the-spot sales require ongoing negotiations, parties
to
exclusivity
agreements
need
not
renegotiate
continuously.107 Even if market prices remain unchanged for
the contract’s duration, eliminating volatility and reducing
the number of transactions—and, by extension, transaction
costs—will reduce the parties’ total expenditures.108
Connelly, supra note 88, at 527. For a variation of this claim, focusing on the
quality of the product, see EFTA, supra note 102, at para. 107(c); see also
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 n.23 (1977); Steuer,
supra note 57, at 131–32. Note, however, that Steuer cites Susser v. Carvel Corp.,
id. at 132 (citing Susser v. Carvel Corp., 323 F.2d 505, 516 (2d Cir. 1964)), and
thus seems to focus more on the way the dealer handles the product (the quality
and functioning of which the manufacturer has guaranteed) than on the
identification of its origin. There are, of course, additional ways in which the
manufacturer can verify the origin of a product, the most obvious of which is by
applying a trademark or logo to the product. However, trademark law is aimed
at preventing consumers’, not producers’, confusion as to origin. See ROBERT M.
MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 529–34, 621–25 (6th ed. 2012); see also AMF, Inc. v.
Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979). Origin-verifiability for the
producer is merely a beneficial byproduct of the prevention of consumer
confusion, which (along with the more recently recognized goal of dilutionprevention) is the aim of trademark law. Therefore, trademark law may not
adequately address the manufacturer’s concern (for example, if consumers are
entirely indifferent as to the origin of the product or if the brand had become
generic). See Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95 (2d
Cir. 1989).
107. BORK, supra note 11, at 309; Stockhausen, supra note 37, at 414; Ornstein,
supra note 102, at 77. Areeda, Kaplow, and Edlin question the need for
exclusivity to achieve this goal. They point to the fact that a simple pattern of
regular repeated purchases from the seller would tend to produce the same
savings. AREEDA ET AL., supra note 88, at 655. But exclusivity does more than to
simply produce these savings. It assures parties, ex ante, that renegotiation will
not be required. Repeated transactions may have this ex post effect, but they do
not offer parties ex ante confidence that this will be the case.
108. At the same time, when a contract is struck for a longer period of time,
the number of contingencies that must be resolved is greater, as is the level of
uncertainty. See Patrick Bolton & Michael D. Whinston, Incomplete Contracts,
Vertical Integration, and Supply Assurance, 60 REV. ECON. STUD. 121 (1993)
(describing concerns that arise from supply assurances). Similarly, future
disagreements on addressing contingencies that arise, which the parties did not
fully consider or specify at the time of signing, can be expected to be higher in
long-term contracts. The cost-savings associated with long-term contracts are
thus more accurately defined as the difference between the savings attributed to
the smaller number of negotiations and the added cost of dealing (both ex ante
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Importantly for current purposes, each one of
exclusivity’s numerous advantages may be relevant both
when exclusivity is widespread, thereby foreclosing large
market shares, and when it is not. Exclusivity arrangements
covering 100% of the market are not less likely to achieve any
of the welfare-enhancing goals than exclusivity
arrangements covering 80% of the market. For example, if
retailers are expected to perform services that cannot be
contracted for, and exclusivity achieves this by tying their
fate to the manufacturer’s fate, a manufacturer can be
expected to attempt to sign such agreements with all
retailers. If the objection to widespread exclusivity is to be
justified, the justification can come only from a linkage
between foreclosure of large market shares and exclusivity’s
anti-competitive potential. The balancing act of weighing
pro- and anti- competitive effects may yield different results
only due to the increased anti-competitive potential of
widespread exclusivity. It cannot hinge on a difference in the
pro-competitive effects. It is, therefore, necessary to carefully
scrutinize exclusivity’s potential for anti-competitive effects.
B. Anti-Competitive Effects
Notwithstanding its welfare-enhancing functions,
exclusivity may also be used anti-competitively. This use is
probably the most intuitive use of exclusivity. Exclusivity
contracts may exclude a competitor or competitors, thus
enhancing or entrenching a firm’s market power.109 For ease
and ex post) with additional and less certain contingencies.
109. A variation of this explanation is offered in David Gilo, Retail Competition
Percolating Through to Suppliers and the Use of Vertical Integration, Tying, and
Vertical Restraints to Stop it, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 25 (2003). According to the
hypothesis developed there, exclusivity may be one means through which an
upstream firm with market power overcomes what is referred to as the
“commitment paradox.” Essentially, through exclusivity the firm is able to assure
its downstream buyer that it will not offer a hidden concession to the buyer’s
competitor. See id. at 54–57. However, in contrast to traditional analysis, the
motivation for the exclusivity arrangement is not to enhance the downstream
buyer’s market power, but rather to allow the upstream firm—the firm granting
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of exposition, we may again think of exclusive purchasing
arrangements, whereby retailers commit to purchase
exclusively from a manufacturer. By signing exclusivity
agreements with retailers, the upstream firm denies its
competitors access to distribution outlets. These competitors
must consequently either distribute their product through
existing outlets that have not committed to exclusive
purchasing, or induce independent entry into distribution. If
the foreclosed outlets are the more efficient outlets—the ones
at the more desirable locations, and so on—the firm granted
exclusivity gains an inherent advantage over its competitors.
The cost disadvantage of these competitors allows the
upstream firm that signed the exclusivity agreements to
profitably elevate prices.110
Although ostensibly straightforward, the anticompetitive potential of exclusivity is, in fact, more complex
than it seems. Early writings of members of the Chicago
School argued that exclusivity is unlikely to ever be used to
forestall competition. The driving force behind this argument
is that anti-competitive exclusivity is detrimental to the
interests of the party granting exclusivity. First, consider the

exclusivity—to exploit its market power and charge supra-competitive wholesale
prices. I do not discuss this function separately because despite the different
motivation, the end result is similar for purposes of the present analysis. As
mentioned previously, there are also other anti-competitive explanations, but
these are more debatable and are contingent on relatively limiting market
characteristics. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
110. The analysis of a cost disadvantage as a prerequisite to, and in fact the
essence of, anti-competitive exclusivity arrangements follows Thomas G.
Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’
Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986), which has since
become the mainstream view of the competitive concern raised by exclusivity
arrangements. See, e.g., A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agreements and
Other Exclusionary Conduct: Are There Unifying Principles?, 73 ANTITRUST L.J.
375 (2006). For a view according to which the focus should be shifted, see Steven
C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed ProfitSacrifice Standard, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 311 (2006). For earlier analyses of the anticompetitive potential, focusing on the exclusion of competitors, see Director &
Levi, supra note 57, at 290; Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 38, at 923–31. See
generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 251 (2d ed. 2001).
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setting of a seller who sells to an end consumer. Posner111
and Bork112 make the point that in this setting an agreement
to exclude competition is highly unlikely. Buyers are
adversely affected by the preservation (or establishment) of
a monopoly. Once the monopoly has been established, these
buyers will be charged higher prices than they would have
been charged had competition prevailed. Knowing this, they
will be reluctant to participate in a scheme to preserve or
establish a monopoly at the seller’s level unless they are
compensated in full for their prospective losses. At the very
least, they will demand to receive the full value of the
monopoly overcharge (which they will ultimately pay) before
they sign exclusivity agreements with the to-be monopolist.
This, in turn, implies that the seller’s prospective gains from
the preservation of the monopoly will all be dissipated in the
form of payments to customers, making the scheme
unprofitable for the seller. Anti-competitive exclusivity—
exclusivity enhancing or entrenching one party’s market
power—cannot be mutually beneficial from the contracting
parties’ perspective. There is thus a natural check on this use
of exclusivity as an anti-competitive device.
This does not, of course, imply that exclusivity is never
mutually beneficial. It will be beneficial if it achieves one or
more of the welfare-enhancing goals previously discussed. In
such settings it has the potential to increase overall—and
consequently both parties’—welfare. But anti-competitive
exclusivity of the kind discussed by Chicago School theorists
cannot achieve this. Anti-competitive exclusivity enhancing
one party’s market power is a zero-sum game, in which any
gain to one of the parties comes at the expense of its
contractual counterpart.
Posner concluded that, although it is not impossible that
out of ignorance or irrationality a firm will engage in
exclusionary practices, “it is unlikely that a rational profit
111. POSNER, supra note 11, at 203–05.
112. BORK, supra note 11.
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maximizing firm will use exclusive dealing as a method of
excluding a competitor.”113 And Bork argued that “[t]he truth
appears to be that there has never been a case in which
exclusive dealing or requirements contracts were shown to
injure competition . . . . [T]here is every reason to believe
that exclusive dealing and requirements contracts have no
purpose or effect other than the creation of efficiency.”114
The analysis does not change if the setting is one of a
manufacturer and retailers instead of a seller and end
consumers. Here too, there is no scope for acquiring
additional market power through exclusivity arrangements
in a manner that benefits both parties. It may seem that,
because retailers can join forces with a manufacturer to
elevate prices to end consumers, there is scope for anticompetitive exclusivity. This, however, is not the case.
Exclusivity does not, in and of itself, change demand for the
product in any way. Therefore, to the extent that it does not
achieve one or more of the pro-competitive goals surveyed
earlier, it does not allow prices to be elevated profitably
beyond their but-for-exclusivity levels. These may be high or
low, depending on the (pre-existing) market power of the
manufacturer and the retailers. But exclusivity in and of
itself will do nothing to change the optimal price that
consumers can be charged for the product. Any increase in
prices
following
an
(anti-competitive)
exclusivity
arrangement of the kind discussed by Chicago School
scholars will inevitably decrease the total (joint) profits of
retailers and the manufacturer, because the effect of lost
sales (end consumers who discontinue purchases due to
higher prices) will necessarily outweigh any gains from
higher prices. Otherwise, retail prices would have already
been set higher before the introduction of exclusivity.
Consequently, post- and pre- exclusivity prices cannot be

113. POSNER, supra note 11, at 205.
114. BORK, supra note 11, at 309.
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different.115
Therefore, if exclusivity confers upon the manufacturer
market power that the manufacturer would not have
otherwise possessed, resulting in elevated prices and
reduced quantities, this will come at the expense of retailers,
whose total profits will have declined. Much like the
relationship between a seller and buyers who are end
consumers, the relationship between a manufacturer and
retailers is a zero-sum game in terms of profit. There is a
single price at which (joint) profits from sales are maximized.
The price-quantity trade-off is maximized at a specific point
on the demand curve. This does not change simply because
the parties have agreed to exclusivity. Any additional dollar
accruing to the manufacturer is a dollar out of retailers’
pockets, and vice versa.116 Consequently, the analysis of the
manufacturer-retailer setting is similar to that of the sellerend consumer setting.117 A mutually beneficial anti-

115. For an early analysis of the phenomenon suggesting that this may be the
case, see Kahn, supra note 5252, at 317; Stockhausen, supra note 3737, at 428–
29. See also cases cited supra note 25.
116. This analysis is attributable to the well-known double marginalization
problem, originally identified developed in the late 1950s and essentially
unchallenged since. If retailers possess market power, whether due to an
oligopolistic market structure or due to a cartel-like agreement, they have
nothing to gain from allowing a monopoly at the manufacturer’s level, for reasons
similar to those discussed with respect to the manufacturer’s incentives. See
Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. POL. ECON.
347, 352 (1950). If transaction costs are not prohibitive, the two successive
monopolies can be expected to negotiate a division of the monopoly rents between
them, and continue to charge the optimal monopoly price. See ROGER D. BLAIR &
JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY: ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 109–25
(1993). If negotiations over the share of the rents granted to each of the economic
agents are prohibitively costly, or otherwise fail, the problem may result in no
production at all as in the “tragedy of the anti-commons.” See Michael A. Heller,
The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to
Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) (describing the tragedy of the anticommons). The tragedy of the anti-commons is in fact an extreme case of the
double marginalization problem.
117. Although not identical in all respects. A formal model illustrating the
difference is developed in Ittai Paldor, RPM as an Exclusionary Practice, 55
ANTITRUST BULL. 309 (2010).
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competitive arrangement of the kind discussed by Posner
and Bork is impossible.
Another important note is that this analysis is
insensitive to the degree of pre-contractual market power
each party possesses. It does not change if the manufacturer
being granted exclusivity has some market power,
significant market power, or even if it is a perfect monopoly.
Similarly, it does not change if retailers’ market power is
significant or insignificant.118 Ultimately, there is a single
optimal price and a single corresponding quantity, both
unaffected by (anti-competitive) exclusivity. An economic
agent allowing a seller or a buyer to artificially enhance its
market power, is in essence transferring some of its share of
the supra-competitive rents to its contractual counterpart.119
Whether it continues to make the same per-unit profit but
loses sales due to elevated prices, or continues to make the
same number of sales for a smaller per-unit profit, it has lost
from the enhancement of a seller’s or buyer’s market
power.120
118. In reality, all economic agents possess some market power. No economic
agent faces a perfectly elastic demand curve. This is known as “monopolostic
competition,” a concept originally developed by Chamberlin. See EDWARD
HASTINGS CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (8th ed.
1962).
119. For a clear articulation of the importance of this phenomenon in the
context of rebates, which for current purposes is similar to the context of
exclusivity, see Timothy J. Brennan, Bundled Rebates as Exclusion Rather than
Predation, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 335, 367–68 (2008).
120. Although similar, this argument is different from the argument that a
manufacturer cannot profit from monopolizing an additional link in the chain of
production. Over the years, several challenges to the so-called “single monopoly
profit theory” have been launched. See Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts,
and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397 (2009)
(summarizing the challenges to the single profit monopoly theory). These
arguments are irrelevant to the current setting. The challenges to the single
monopoly profit theory attempt to demonstrate that when two markets are
involved, a seller may, under certain circumstances, use its power in one market
to increase its market power in another market. But this does not challenge the
idea that when the link of production for the same product is being considered,
the vertical relationship between an upstream firm and a downstream firm is a
zero-sum game.
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Later writings on exclusivity qualified this extreme
version of the argument. It has been shown that customers
may be induced to participate in a monopoly-creating
scheme.121 But importantly, the key point made by Bork and
Posner—that in the regular setting anti-competitive
exclusivity harms the entities granting exclusivity—remains
uncontested.122 Specifically, it has been shown that a
collective action problem amongst economic agencies at the
level in the chain of production granting exclusivity
(retailers, in the previous example) may result in anticompetitive exclusivity arrangements being struck. If a
seller need not foreclose all existing retail outlets in order to
preempt entry, a buyers’ collective action problem emerges.
Although it is in their best interest to withhold their consent
to a foreclosure scheme that will result in higher prices
charged to them, buyers may ultimately participate in it for
a price that fails to compensate them for their future
losses.123 Each buyer faces the dilemma of either committing
to exclusivity for a payment or risking ultimately facing a
monopolistic seller without having received any
compensation at all. Consider, for example, an industry in
which recovering the fixed costs of production requires
serving at least a quarter of the market.124 A seller can thus
drive out all potential competitors by signing exclusivity
contracts with only 75.1% of the buyers. Acting as a group,
buyers will undoubtedly turn down the offer, and allow
competition between four sellers to drive prices down. But
buyers do not decide or act as a group. Each individual buyer
realizes that if three-quarters of the buyers grant the seller
exclusivity, a monopoly will have been established. Knowing

121. See Kaplow & Shapiro, supra note 11, at 1204–05.
122. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
123. For a less formal exposition of this result, see Louis Kaplow, Extension of
Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 532 (1985).
124. On the concept of fixed costs, see CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 88, at
29–33. On the concept of “minimum efficient scale” [of production], see id. at 41–
42.
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this, each individual buyer will prefer to sign an exclusivity
contract in return for a payment, rather than ultimately pay
the monopoly price for no compensation at all. Thus, not only
can the seller acquire a monopoly by compensating only
slightly more than three-quarters of the buyers for their
future losses, it can in fact offer even those buyers less than
full compensation. A race to the bottom among buyers will
result in enough buyers agreeing to exclusivity, even if they
are not fully compensated for their future loss, for fear of
facing the same result with no remuneration at all.125
The upshot of the qualification to the Chicago School
analysis is that in the intuitive case of exclusivity that simply
forecloses the market to competitors, exclusivity
arrangements carry anti-competitive potential if, and,
importantly, only if, there is a collective action problem
among buyers. Contrary to intuition, anti-competitive
exclusivity does not benefit both parties to these kinds of
exclusivity arrangements. While the seller, or the party being
granted (anti-competitive) exclusivity is better off as a result
of the exclusives, the parties granting exclusivity are made
worse off as a result. It is the collective action problem among
buyers that allows this result.126 As a practical matter, this

125. I use the term “race to the bottom” rather than “competition” to describe
buyers’ conduct. The reason is that the end result is worse (from the buyers’
perspective) than under competition. Under competition, buyers—at least those
who ultimately sign exclusivity agreements—will receive their marginal cost,
namely their difference between the post- and pre- exclusivity prices multiplied
by their respective expected quantity (and capitalized, if the payment takes the
form of a lump sum). In the setting described here, buyers may receive a sum
lower than their marginal cost. See supra note 11.
126. This analysis ignores competition among potential sellers to become the
monopoly, or “competition for the market.” Such competition may counter the
collective action problem at the buyers’ level, and result in sellers offering larger
payments for exclusivity. See, e.g., Paddock Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chi. Trib. Co., 103
F.3d 42 (7th Cir. 1996). But see Dir. of Investigation & Rsch. v. D&B Cos. of Can.
Ltd. (Nielsen) [1995] C.C.T.D. No. 20, 64 C.P.R. (3d) 216 (Can. Ont. C.C.T.D.). At
the extreme, sellers may share all of their prospective rents with downstream
buyers. But even under such circumstances, only some of the buyers will be
compensated for their prospective losses. More importantly, in real-life settings
the tension between sellers’ competition and buyers’ collective action problem
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qualification may not seem important, since most industries
involve more than a single buyer and a single seller. So, it
would seem that there is almost always potential for a
collective action problem, and consequently for anticompetitive exclusivity. And indeed, the important practical
implications of this specific prerequisite for anti-competitive
exclusivity have thus far been overlooked. Although the
theoretical understanding of exclusivity is now more than
three decades old, this has not impacted the courts’ analysis
of exclusivity in any meaningful way. However, as I will
subsequently show, this has extremely important
implications for the analysis.
III. “MONOPOLY OVER MONOPOLY STATUS” – THE NATURAL
CHECK ON ANTI-COMPETITIVE EXCLUSIVITY
Against the backdrop of exclusivity’s welfare-enhancing
potential, it is important to carefully examine the contours of
its anti-competitive potential. Specifically, it is important to
understand under what circumstances exclusivity has
limited or no potential for being anti-competitive. As
exclusivity can always achieve pro-competitive goals, the
rule of reason analysis must focus on identifying
circumstances under which it is likely to be anti-competitive.
Antitrust law has already identified certain categories of
such circumstances. For example, the rule according to
which exclusivity foreclosing extremely small market shares
will almost automatically be upheld is such a rule. It is based
on the uncontested understanding that the anti-competitive
potential is largely curbed under such circumstances. 127
Similarly, the idea that if barriers to entry are not high,
exclusivity should raise little concern, is again a balancing
may result in some midway equilibrium in which buyers are under-compensated,
albeit less so than under no competition among sellers. Finally, one can think of
circumstances in which there is no competition, or little competition, among
sellers to become the monopoly. For example, if there is only one seller who is
capable of serving the whole market.
127. HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 435–37; see also infra note 148.
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act within the framework of the rule of reason.128 If barriers
to entry are low, there is no reason to think that exclusivity
may inhibit competition. Higher prices will attract entry into
the market. Under such circumstances, exclusivity’s welfareenhancing potential far outweighs its anti-competitive
potential. In view of the preceding analysis, another such
rule should be put in place. Surprisingly, this rule pertains
to the setting of extremely large foreclosure.
A. Industries in which Forestalling Competition Requires
Foreclosure of All Outlets
In view of the preceding analysis, it should be clear by
now that industries in which all outlets must be foreclosed in
order to forestall competition are industries in which there is
limited scope for anti-competitive exclusivity. Anticompetitive exclusivity of the kind discussed here is not even
a theoretical option in such industries. The question is only
whether such industries are common. As will be shown, they
are.
First, consider the extreme case of a single buyer, a
monopsony, granting exclusivity to a seller. The share of the
market that has been foreclosed is 100%. There is a single
buyer, who has committed to purchase all its needs from a
specific seller. The sellers’ competitors cannot make any
sales at all. However, perhaps counter-intuitively, this is a
case that should raise no competitive concern. There is no
collective action problem, because there is only one economic
agent capable of granting exclusivity. Such a monopsony has
no concern that its competitors will grant exclusivity and
leave it facing a monopolistic seller. If a monopsony grants a
seller exclusivity, it cannot be allowing its seller to
subsequently raise prices, unless the seller fully
compensates the monopsony for its future loss, which would
mean that the seller has gained nothing from the agreement.
128. On the balancing act (and skepticism regarding its efficacy), see Posner,
supra note 20.
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The only plausible explanation in this setting is that
exclusivity achieves one or more of the welfare-enhancing
goals previously discussed, leaving both parties to the
transaction (and society as a whole) better off. An anticompetitive explanation is not persuasive. In these settings,
Bork’s stipulation that “there is every reason to believe that
exclusive dealing and requirements contracts have no
purpose or effect other than the creation of efficiency”129
seems convincing with respect to exclusivity agreements
designed to foreclose markets.
Next, the analysis can be extended to cases that do not
involve a monopoly (or monopsony) granting exclusivity.
There are other cases in which there is no collective action
problem among the firm or firms granting exclusivity. This
is the case, for example, in an industry in which foreclosing
the market requires foreclosing all existing outlets. Each
buyer is then indispensable if the market is to be foreclosed
to the seller’s competitors, and there is again no collective
action problem. An industry in which foreclosure requires
the acquiescence of all retailers may seem rare. But in
reality, this is probably more common than it would seem.
Any industry in which one retailer or more has enough
volume to sustain an upstream manufacturer will meet this
criterion. Consider the case of an industry with eight
retailers of (more or less) equal size, in which an upstream
enterprise is viable if it serves 8%, 9%, or even 10% of the
market. As each of the retailers’ market share is 12.5%, each
can sustain an upstream seller. There is no collective action
problem. No single retailer faces the risk of ultimately facing
a monopoly if it does not grant exclusivity.
Although the specific numeric values presented here are
stylized, and designed to illustrate the point, settings in
which all outlets are essential for forestalling competition
seem extremely common. This may be the case in industries
with a handful of large outlets, in industries with quite a few
129. BORK, supra note 11, at 309.
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medium-size outlets, and in industries in which there are
numerous small outlets. Several prominent examples of such
settings are provided below. In such settings, each of the
retailers is indispensable if the manufacturer wants to
foreclose the market to its competitors. Similar to the setting
of an industry with a single buyer, there is no collective
action problem at the buyers’ level. There is no scope for anticompetitive exclusivity of the kind discussed here.
In these settings, each retailer possesses a monopoly
over the seller’s monopoly status, that is similar to the
monopoly the single buyer had in the previous example.
Importantly, monopoly over the seller’s monopoly status does
not require a monopoly in the relevant product or geographic
market. The point made here is precisely that a number of
retailers may each have this monopoly over the seller’s
monopoly status, even if none of them can in any way be
considered dominant in the product market. Each of them
can withhold monopoly status from the seller to whom they
grant exclusivity. The consideration each retailer will
demand for such exclusivity will fall between that retailer’s
prospective losses and the full monopoly rents the
manufacturer expects to earn. None of the retailers will
grant exclusivity for less than its share of the prospective
monopoly overcharge (in the numeric example used here,
12.5% of the overcharge). And some may demand up to the
full amount of monopoly rents that the seller is expected to
extract. If all eight retailers demand the bare minimum—
their respective share of the overcharge—nothing will have
been gained through anti-competitive exclusivity. Neither
the manufacturer nor any of the retailers will be any better
off. If any of the retailers demands even trivially more than
its prospective share of the monopoly overcharge, the
exclusivity program will become detrimental to the
manufacturer (who can then, of course, be expected to
abandon the whole endeavor). Anti-competitive exclusivity of
the kind discussed here is impossible not only when
exclusivity is agreed to by a monopsony, but also when it is
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granted in an industry in which all retail establishments can
sustain an upstream business.
B. Industries in which Forestalling Competition Requires
Foreclosure of Large Market Shares
The case for allowing exclusivity that forecloses
extremely large market shares is, in fact, even stronger than
the previous analyses suggest. The analysis can be
broadened, and can be applied to settings in which not all
retailers can withhold the monopoly status from the seller.
The more retailers are able to withhold the status from the
seller, the less probable anti-competitive exclusivity
becomes.
To see why, let us begin with a theoretical possibility. If
not all buyers have a monopoly over monopoly status, anticompetitive exclusivity is reintroduced as a theoretical
construct. The reason is that those retailers who cannot
withhold the status from the seller may be exploited. A
retailer’s acquiescence to anti-competitive exclusivity creates
a negative externality on other retailers. And this negative
externality can be harnessed to benefit both the seller and
the acquiescing buyer or buyers. Consider an industry with
ten buyers, eight of whom are essential for blocking
competitors. The previous analysis will hold with respect to
these retailers. None of them can be taken advantage of. But
as some of the monopoly overcharge is charged to the two
other buyers, it may be possible to compensate all eight
buyers for their prospective losses, and nonetheless profit
from charging the two other retailers monopoly prices.
Therefore, theoretically, anti-competitive exclusivity
may still be possible as long as not all buyers possess
monopoly over monopoly status. But because it is only the
non-essential retailers that can be exploited, and because the
profits derived from exploiting these retailers must be
shared with all essential retailers (as well as the
manufacturer), there is a practical limit on the viability of
anti-competitive exclusivity. Specifically, the more buyers
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are able to withhold the status from the seller, the less likely
anti-competitive exclusivity becomes. There are several
reasons for this. First, there is an inherent tension between
the viability of the anti-competitive scheme and its
profitability. The viability of the scheme is largely contingent
on the non-exclusive buyers’ total market share being small.
If their market share is not small, they will be able to sustain
the competitors’ business, and are therefore essential for
exclusivity. At the same time, the profitability of the scheme
depends on the non-exclusive buyers jointly holding a large
market share. Otherwise, given that the exclusive buyers
need to be fully compensated, the scheme will not be
profitable.
In the scenario described here of eight buyers agreeing
to exclusivity, the market share of the two remaining
competitors must be small enough that they cannot sustain
the manufacturer’s competitors. Otherwise, foreclosing the
eight retailers will not exclude a competitor. The ability to
sustain the business of a competing manufacturer depends
chiefly on these two buyers’ total volume of sales. So, in order
for the exclusivity plan to achieve its anti-competitive goal,
the joint market share of these two retailers must be
relatively small. But the profitability of anti-competitive
exclusivity depends mostly on these retailers’ market share
being large enough so that their exploitation—the marginal
increase in the price they are charged as a result of the
establishment of a monopoly—generates enough profit to
share between the artificially-created monopoly and the
other eight retailers. In other words, in order for the scheme
to be possible, the exploited retailers’ share must be small.
But in order for the scheme to be profitable, the exploited
retailers’ market share must be large. The tension between
the viability of the scheme and its profitability thus makes
anti-competitive exclusivity far less likely.
A second reason for why anti-competitive exclusivity
becomes less likely as the market share required for
forestalling competition increases has to do with a problem
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that is well known in closely related contexts—the double
marginalization problem.130 As the number of retailers that
are essential for blocking competitors increases, so does the
likelihood that at least some of them will demand a share of
the supra-competitive rents that makes the whole endeavor
unprofitable from the manufacturer’s perspective. Even if
some of them demand only trivially more than their
respective loss, the aggregate may make the whole scheme
unprofitable.131 Once again, in the example of the tenretailer industry described here, if each of the eight retailers
demand a seventh of the monopoly overcharge, the scheme
will not be profitable.132
Finally, transaction costs must be accounted for.
Agreeing to anti-competitive exclusivity can be expected to
be extremely costly. Each economic agent granting
exclusivity must accurately assess its share of the expected
overcharge, as must the party being granted exclusivity. This
entails both assessing the expected monopolistic overcharge
and addressing potential future fluctuations in each of the
exclusive retailers’ market shares. If any of the exclusive
retailers’ market share changes during the duration of the
exclusivity commitment, its share of the overcharge will
change, as will the share of the competing retailer or
retailers whose market share has decreased or increased.
Accounting for these contingencies seems extremely costly.
And the more retailers there are that can withhold monopoly
status from the manufacturer, the more costly exclusivity
becomes, because an exclusivity agreement must be struck
130. Double marginalization regularly occurs in product markets in which
each of two successive monopolies in the chain of production disregards the effect
their pricing has on the other, resulting in prices that are above the optimal level,
to the detriment of both monopolies. See Spengler, supra note 116.
131. The uniqueness of the current setting is that the two (or, more likely, the
several) monopolies are in fact competitors in the product market. They are
successive monopolies only with respect to their monopoly over the seller’s
monopoly status.
132. Because if monopoly rents are X, the manufacturer will have to pay
14% more than it can afford to.
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with each retailer.
Thus, although anti-competitive exclusivity of the kind
discussed by Chicago School theorists is theoretically
possible if competition can be forestalled without the
acquiescence of all retailers, it becomes extremely unlikely
as the market share required to forestall competition reaches
very large market shares. The extremely small profits
derived from the non-exclusive share of the market will have
to be divided among a large number of participants; any one
of a large number of retailers attempting to extract even
trivially more than the precise amount of its expected
overcharge will jeopardize the profitability of the scheme;
and the contingencies that will have to be addressed with
precision will, at the very least, largely increase transaction
costs.
The implications of this analysis can be demonstrated in
several prominent billion-dollar industries in which current
theory and doctrine suggest that exclusivity may be
problematic. As will be shown, large-scale exclusivity is
unlikely to be anti-competitive in these industries, and
should in fact be presumed benign.
C. Exclusivity in the Real World
Several prominent real-life industries demonstrate how
the current (mis)understanding of exclusivity disallows
parties to reach welfare-enhancing agreements, resulting in
a social loss. Specifically, these industries demonstrate that
while foreclosure of a 60% to 70% market share may indeed
be designed to forestall competition, foreclosure of 85% to
90% is unlikely to be anti-competitive.
1. Exclusivity in E-Commerce
Exclusivity arrangements signed with large e-retailers
such as Amazon have recently come under attack worldwide.
Although the welfare-enhancing potential of these
arrangements is not contested, the concern is that they may
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inhibit competition and ultimately raise prices to
consumers.133 Some antitrust authorities have even banned
certain kinds of exclusivity arrangements in the e-commerce
sector altogether.134 A closer look at the sector shows that the
competitive concerns are misplaced.
According to a July 2018 report by eMarketer, the ten
largest US online retailers account for 70.1% of this over$525 billion industry. The four largest retailers account for
approximately 63% of sales.135 Exclusivity arrangements
foreclosing a 60% to 70% market share may indeed be anticompetitive. At least with respect to some products, for which
fixed costs (such as R&D, marketing, and logistical costs) are
significant, it stands to reason that a wholesaler must have
presence in at least one of the four largest retailers in order
for its business to be viable. Thus, a wholesaler that signs
exclusivity agreements with these four retailers, may
thereby block its competitors’ access to the market. The four
retailers’ acquiescence to this anti-competitive scheme is also
plausible. They may have agreed to anti-competitive
exclusivity and received remuneration for their share of the
expected overcharge. The higher prices to be charged to the
remaining 40% of the market provide a revenue stream that
would allow both the wholesaler and the four large retailers
to benefit from the elimination of competition.
But let us now consider a wholesaler who, due to the cost
structure in its industry, must foreclose significantly larger
market shares, say 90%, in order to block its competitors’
133. See, e.g., Report From The Commission To The Council And The European
Parliament: Final Report on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry, para. 26, COM (2017)
229 final (May 10, 2017). Note, that the analysis focuses on selective distribution
systems, which are the practical equivalent of an exclusivity commitment. See id.
paras. 9–22.
134. See, e.g., Aftab Ahmed & Sankalp Phartiyal, India Tightens E-commerce
Rules, Likely to Hit Amazon, Flipkart, REUTERS (Dec. 26, 2018, 1:11 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-ecommerce-idUSKCN1OP14M.
135. Corey McNair, Top 10 US Ecommerce Companies in 2018, EMARKETER
(Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.emarketer.com/content/top-10-us-ecommercecompanies-in-2018.
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access to the market. As mentioned, the ten largest retailers
account for 70.1% of the market, out of which the four largest
retailers account for 63%. The six retailers that are next in
line in terms of size thus account for a total of approximately
7% of the market, or slightly more than 1% on average. And
a large number of retailers who do not rank among the top
ten retailers in terms of size obviously hold market shares of
less than 1% (or $5.25 billion in dollar terms) on average.136
Foreclosing the market to the wholesaler’s competitors
would require the acquiescence of tens, if not hundreds, of
retailers. If that is the case, anti-competitive exclusivity
becomes practically impossible. There would be tens, or
hundreds, of “monopolists” (with power over the seller’s
market power) that would need to be brought on board, each
making its own demand (and possibly overcharging the
wholesaler). The costs of foreclosure would be unimaginable.
Reaching an agreement with numerous retailers and
compensating each of them for their future share of the
overcharge would require assessing each retailer’s expected
share of the overcharge, and agreeing on compensation.
Importantly, it would require bargaining ex ante with
numerous retailers for the calibration of compensation in
case of fluctuations in sales’ volume. Even very small
changes in market shares in this dynamic industry would
require major changes in compensation. Compensation paid
to a retailer whose market share increased from 0.5% to
0.6%, a change that is unlikely to be significant from the
wholesaler’s perspective, would have to be recalibrated.
Otherwise,
that
retailer
would
be
paying
an
(uncompensated) monopoly overcharge for twenty percent of
its purchases. This recalibration would, in turn, require
recalibration of the compensation paid to a competitor whose
market share had shrunk. If the latter were not recalibrated,
the wholesaler would be overpaying for exclusivity. And the
changes to compensation in each of these contingencies

136. See id.
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would have to be bargained for ex ante. This seems almost
imaginary. And even if it were somehow accomplished, the
market share that would remain for exploitation would be
extremely small. Presumably, only a handful of retailers
whose market shares are trivial could not sustain a
competing enterprise. And it is only these retailers that could
be exploited.
Ultimately, anti-competitive exclusivity foreclosing 60%
to 70% of the market seems plausible. Anti-competitive
exclusivity foreclosing 90% to 95% of the market is virtually
impossible.137 If exclusivity arrangements foreclosing 90% of
the market are observed, the reason is likely some welfareenhancing goal that these arrangements achieve.
Surprisingly, foreclosure of very large market shares
provides a safeguard against anti-competitive exclusivity,
not a factor worsening the competitive situation.
2. The Food-Retail Industry in Canada
The Canadian food-retail industry is also illuminating in
this respect. According to a report published in 2017, this $85
billion industry is dominated by three firms—Loblaw, Metro,
and Sobeys—whose combined market share is estimated to
be approximately 60%.138 The Canadian Competition Act
would make exclusivity arrangements signed by any of these
major suppliers actionable.139 But independent retailers hold
a stable market share of approximately 40%, amounting to

137. Of course, foreclosure of smaller magnitude may prevent some
competitors from entering, but this will not change the analysis. The rents will
be smaller, and the seller will be willing to pay less for exclusivity. Additionally,
coordination problems among the sellers that were not excluded would emerge.
138. USDA FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., RETAIL FOODS: THE RETAIL LANDSCAPE OF
CANADA 5 (Feb. 21, 2017), https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20
Publications/Retail%20Foods_Ottawa_Canada_2-15-2017.pdf; QUEEN’S UNIV.
INV. COUNS., CANADIAN GROCERY MARKET REPORT: A FRESH LOOK AT SOME
APPETIZING INVESTMENTS 3 (Jan. 16, 2017), http://www.quiconline.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/09/CH-Canadian-Grocery-Report-01.16.17.pdf.
139. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-34 § 77 (Can.).

1146

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

$31 billion of sales in 2017.140 Among these independent
retailers are many mom-and-pop type stores that have no
affiliation with a wholesaler.141 And chain discount retailers
such as Costco and Walmart have also significantly
increased their market share in recent years.142 If exclusivity
is signed with the “Big Three” and perhaps with Costco and
Walmart, resulting in foreclosure of 60% to 75%, one might
believe that the market was anti-competitively foreclosed.
Again, the industry may be such that a seller must serve at
least one of these five large retailers for its business to be
sustainable. Foreclosing all of these outlets may prevent
competition, and allow the contracting parties to share the
profits by exploiting the remaining retailers. But if
independent retailers are sufficient to sustain a competitor,
foreclosure of 90% and higher becomes a pre-requisite for
anti-competitive exclusivity. The idea that hundreds or
thousands of arrangements are being signed for the benefit
of exploiting several retailers with trivial market shares
seems uncompelling, at the very least. Once again,
foreclosure of 70% may be anti-competitive. Foreclosure of
90% provides comfort that exclusivity is not anti-competitive.
3. The UK Food and Grocery Industry
Finally, the UK food and grocery retail industry provides
another illustrative example. The UK Competition Act
prohibits agreements preventing, restricting or distorting
competition.143 This prohibition is interpreted to apply, inter
alia, to exclusivity agreements, and legal experts explicitly
caution against any exclusivity arrangement foreclosing

140. George Condon, The 2017 Annual Market Survey, CANADIAN GROCER
(Mar. 22, 2018), http://www.canadiangrocer.com/research/the-2017-annualmarket-survey-79472.
141. Id.
142. Id.; QUEEN’S UNIV. INV. COUNS., supra note 138, at 3.
143. Competition Act 1998, c. 41 § 2 (UK), https://www.legislation.gov.uk
/ukpga/1998/41/contents.
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market shares of over 30%.144
But a look at the food and grocery retail industry
suggests that widespread exclusivity in this industry should
raise very little concern. Each of the ten major competitors—
Tesco, Sainsbury’s, Asda, Morrisons, Aldi, Co-Op, Lidl,
Waitrose, Iceland, and Ocado145—is indispensable if an
exclusivity scheme is to exclude a producer’s competitors.
These competitors account for a total of over 96% of this £180
billion industry, and even the smallest of these major
retailers holds a market share of 1.4%,146 accounting for
approximately £2.5 billion in sales. It is hard to see how anticompetitive exclusivity can be accomplished. All ten chains
would have to agree to charging essentially nothing more
than their expected losses (which would require pinpointing
the expected overcharge with precision, making transactions
far more costly), all for the benefit of overcharging the
remaining 3.5% of retailers. If exclusivity is struck with all
ten chains, it seems far more likely that a welfare-enhancing
goal has been achieved.
IV. FORECLOSURE OF LARGE MARKET SHARES –
A PRACTICAL RULE
The preceding analysis suggests that there is an upper
boundary on exclusivity’s anti-competitive potential. In some
industries, specifically when exclusivity is granted by a
monopoly or monopsony, foreclosure of extremely large

144. Kathryn Rogers, Distribution Agreements and UK/EC Competition Law,
CRIPPS PEMBERTON GREENISH (June 13, 2017), https://www.crippspg.co.uk
/distribution-agreements-competition-law-2/.
145. See Lidl tops Waitrose to become UK’s seventh biggest grocer, BBC NEWS
(Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-41011259. With the
exception of the change in Lidl’s positioning, the 2016 data are not very different.
See RETAIL ECONOMICS, UK FOOD AND GROCERY SECTOR REPORT 15 (2016),
https://www.retaileconomics.co.uk/download/Sample%20-%20UK%20Food%20
and%20Grocery%20Sector.pdf.
146. See Lidl tops Waitrose to become UK’s seventh biggest grocer, supra note
145.
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market shares cannot be anti-competitive in the manner
discussed here, even on a theoretical basis. In most
industries, exclusivity foreclosing large market shares is
unlikely to be anti-competitive. Industries with several
retailers of equal size, none of whom holds a market share
that is significantly larger than other retailers’ share, are
industries in which there is no real potential for anticompetitive exclusivity.
The current paradigm must be changed. For small and
medium market shares, the competitive danger posed by
exclusivity agreements raises as the foreclosed market share
increases. But for relatively large market shares, the danger
is reduced as the foreclosed market share increases. Just as
exclusivity arrangements foreclosing small market shares
are considered presumptively benign, so should exclusivity
agreements foreclosing extreme market shares. Foreclosure
of 100% should, paradoxically, raise less concern than
foreclosure of 90%. The prevalent (and very intuitive) view
according to which the competitive danger always increases
as the foreclosed market share increases,147 is simply wrong.
The precise percentage from which exclusivity is
unlikely to produce any anti-competitive outcome depends on
specific case-by-case factors.148 There is no single percentage
of foreclosure beyond which exclusivity will never be anticompetitive. Suggesting a single percentage applicable to all
industries under all settings would thus be a gross
147. Commission Notice: Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 2000 O.J. (C
291/01) paras. 21–25; RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW 594–98 (5th ed. 2003);
BARRY J. RODGER & AGNUS MACCULLOCH, COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 189–95 (2d ed. 2002); CDC
Techs., Inc. v. IDEXX Labs., Inc., 186 F.3d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding no
competitive danger despite the large market share foreclosed).
148. Such as the industry cost-structure (of both the link in the chain of
production granting exclusivity and the link in the chain of production being
granted exclusivity). On other barriers to entry (regulation, industry-specific
sunk costs, etc.), see CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 8888, at 29, 73–82. On
profit-margins, the length of the exclusivity covenant, and the ease of termination
of the contract, see Omega Env’t, Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir.
1997).
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oversimplification. Nonetheless, as in many other areas of
antitrust law, for practical purposes it is helpful to propose a
rule of thumb—a tentative upper boundary, beyond which
exclusivity arrangements should enjoy a refutable
presumption of legality.
This percentage can be informed by the experience
gained over the years with the opposite end of the scale—
foreclosure of insignificant market shares. As will be shown,
anecdotal empirical analyses covering a large number of
industries in the United States bolsters the conclusion
derived from this comparison.
Antitrust law has long grappled with the lower
threshold, below which exclusivity arrangements are
presumed benign. Antitrust theory and law assume, in line
with traditional analysis of exclusivity arrangements (and
with the analysis advanced in this Article), that exclusivity
arrangements foreclosing insignificant market shares raise
no real competitive concern. Antitrust theory has not
provided a hard and fast number below which exclusivity
should be presumed benign, or a framework for producing
such a number. Nonetheless, antitrust law has provided a
ballpark figure. Courts almost automatically uphold
exclusivity arrangements foreclosing market shares of 15%
to 30%.149 Block Exemptions in the European Union
149. See, e.g., Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Visa U.S.A., No. 04
Civ.8967(BSJ), 2005 WL 1515399, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2005) (“Generally
speaking, cases construing Jefferson Parish have held that an agreement must
foreclose at least 30 percent to 40 percent of the market to support a § 1 violation,
and one treatise advises that there thus exists a ‘virtual safe harbor . . . for
market foreclosure of 20 percent or less.’”); ZF Meritor, L.L.C. v. Eaton Corp., 696
F.3d 254, 326 (3d Cir. 2012); Kentucky v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 191 F. Supp.
3d 694, 702 (W.D. Ky. 2016); McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 837 (11th Cir.
2015) (“Traditionally a foreclosure percentage of at least 40% has been a
threshold for liability in exclusive dealing cases.”); Omega Env’t, Inc. v. Gilbarco,
Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1997). Even courts willing to set the threshold
at a lower percentage have normally relied on aggravating factors, and have not
generally struck down exclusivity arrangements foreclosing less than 20%. See
Masimo Corp. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. L.P., No. OV 02-4770 MRP, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 29977, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2004) (relying on Twin City
Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles O. Finely & Co., 676 F.2d 1291, 1298 (9th Cir. 1982)
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specifically mention 30% as a threshold under which
exclusivity arrangements are presumed benign.150 This may
be mirrored in the context of extreme foreclosure. Of course,
caution must be taken when instating a new rule of thumb,
so that it is not overly inclusive. As a conservative measure,
it seems appropriate to use the lower end of the 15% to 30%
range. Just as foreclosure of market shares of 15% or less
enjoy a ‘safe harbor,’ foreclosure of 85% and higher should
presumptively be considered benign.
The 85% threshold is supported by a study covering a
wide range of industries. In an article published in March of
2014, The Economist divided the US economy into 893
sectors, covered by America’s five-year economic census. The
Economist found that the weighted average share of the four
largest firms in each sector was 32%.151 The average market
share of a large firm is thus 8%. This, in turn, implies that
normally, when a market share of 85% and higher has been
foreclosed, only one large firm in the industry will not have
committed to exclusivity. If all large firms but one, as well as
a large number of smaller firms, have committed to
exclusivity, the analysis developed in this Article suggests
that the probability that exclusivity is anti-competitive is
extremely small. Thus, exclusivity foreclosing an 85%
market share and higher should be considered competitively
benign.
This presumption of pro-competitiveness must be
refutable. This is so for three main reasons: First, further
empirical research is called for. Although the survey on
(striking down arrangements foreclosing a 24% market share)).
150. Commission Regulation 330/2010 of Apr. 20, 2010 on the Application of
Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to
Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices, 2010 O.J. (L 102) 1;
Commission Regulation 2790/99, supra note 22, at 3; see also Israel’s Block
Exemption Rule For Vertical Non-Price Agreements, 25/07/2013 (Publication
Num. 500434).
151. Too Much of a Good Thing, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 26, 2016),
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21695385-profits-are-too-high-americaneeds-giant-dose-competition-too-much-good-thing.
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which the analysis is based is a comprehensive one, covering
nearly nine hundred industries, it is nonetheless a single
survey. Future systematic research may call for a change of
the specific percentage.
Second, even if the findings of this survey are confirmed
by future research, the survey suggests an average figure.
The precise percentage from which large foreclosure provides
a safeguard will change from industry to industry based on
each industry’s characteristics.
One obvious factor that would change the specific
percentage in different industries is the number of
competitors in the industry.152 The smaller the number of
firms in the market, the larger the average size of these
firms. This implies that for a given foreclosure rate necessary
for the elimination of competition, the smaller the number of
firms in the market, the smaller the probability of anticompetitive exclusivity. This is so because there is more
likely to be more than one firm that has a monopoly over
monopoly status. For example, in an industry in which
forestalling competition requires foreclosure of 75.1% of the
market, anti-competitive foreclosure is possible if there are
one hundred retailers with equal market shares (because
foreclosure can be achieved even if as many as twenty-four
retailers decline the exclusivity offer). It is less likely to occur

152. I do not use the term “concentration ratio,” as in the present context it is
important to decouple two elements of concentration—the number of firms, and
the distribution of size among these firms. In the most commonly used index, the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, concentration rises the larger the average size of
the firms (measured in terms of market share) and the greater the differentiation
between the firms in terms of size. In the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4),
which is one instance of the general CRK test (𝐶𝑅𝐾 = ∑𝐾
𝐼=1 𝑆𝑖 ), the distribution of
size positively impacts concentration indirectly, because the total size of the
largest firms can be expected to be greater the greater the inequality in
distribution. See generally B. Curry & K. D. George, Industrial Concentration: A
Survey, 31 J. INDUST. ECON. 203, 204–10 (1983). As Curry & George note, values
of three to eight are usually employed. Id. For a less formal description of the two
most common indices and a discussion of their shortcomings and relative
advantages, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 456–63 (2d ed.
1999).
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if there are six, seven, or eight retailers of equal size (because
only one retailer is expendable if a manufacturer attempts to
foreclose the market). And it is impossible if there are four
retailers or less.
Another factor affecting the likelihood of anticompetitive exclusivity, closely related to the previous one,
focuses not on the number of firms in the market, but rather
on the distribution of size among these firms. This is
important because for any given number of firms, the more
uniform the distribution of market shares among the larger
firms in the industry, the less likely anti-competitive
exclusivity becomes. As explained, when market shares are
relatively similar, all entities are likely to be essential for
forestalling competition. By contrast, when there is a single
dominant firm whose market share is large but not extreme,
and other smaller firms, anti-competitive exclusivity is more
likely. The smaller firms may be exploited. In an industry
with four competitors of equal size, anti-competitive
exclusivity is unlikely. In an industry with four competitors,
three of whom have a 10% market share and one of whom
holds 70% of the market, anti-competitive exclusivity is
plausible.
Due to the fact that the precise percentage is based on a
single study, and given the potential differences between
industries, the 85% threshold advocated here should not be
irrefutable. Plaintiffs should be allowed to produce evidence
rebutting this presumption under specific market
circumstances.
Nonetheless, the fact that the 85% figure is not engraved
in stone should not dissuade policy makers from adopting
such a figure as a default rule. The use of workable rule-ofthumb values is in no way foreign to antitrust analysis, and
is in fact the norm in antitrust enforcement. Similar rule-ofthumb values that are not precise in the same sense are used
in various contexts of antitrust law. For example, in the
context of product market definition, the test adopted by the
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission is the
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‘hypothetical monopoly test,’ which seeks to determine the
profitability of a “small but significant non-transitory
increase in price” (SSNIP). The “small but significant”
element of this test is generally translated to mean a 5%
increase in price.153 This figure is also inaccurate in the same
sense.154 “Small but significant” could have been translated
to mean 2.5% or 15%. Similarly, the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) is used to assess the probable effects of
horizontal mergers on market concentration. Within the
framework of the HHI, the government sets general
standards: it considers markets in which the post-merger
HHI is less than 1500 to be unconcentrated, markets in
which the post-merger HHIs are between 1500 and 2500 to
be moderately concentrated, and markets in which postmerger HHIs are above 2500 to be highly concentrated.155
These values are not based on any precise analysis. Again,
one could just as easily have supported a stipulation of 2000
HHI-points as the upper boundary of moderately
concentrated markets. The government also considers a 100
HHI-point increase in a moderately concentrated market
and a 200 HHI-point increase in a highly concentrated
market to potentially raise significant competitive concerns
(in the former case) or be likely to enhance market power (in
the latter case). This precise quantification is imprecise, if
not arbitrary. Different market shares are also used in
attempted monopolization and in illegal monopolization
cases under section 2 of the Sherman Act. Finally, in the
present context of exclusivity arrangements, the 40%
threshold for condemnation is not inherently more
153. U.S. DEP’T JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
4.1.2 (1997), https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010.
154. And indeed, the FTC and DOJ reserve the right to use a different figure:
“However, what constitutes a ‘small but significant and nontransitory’ increase
in price, commensurate with a significant loss of competition caused by the
merger, depends upon the nature of the industry and the merging firms’ positions
in it, and the Agencies may accordingly use a price increase that is larger or
smaller than five percent.” Id.
155. Id. at 5.3.
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compelling than a 35% one.
Thus, the setting of an 85% threshold is not itself
objectionable. But as it is imprecise, the presumption of
legality for foreclosure exceeding this threshold must be
refutable.156 Industries may exist in which a collective action
problem is prevalent even when the foreclosed market share
reaches levels of 90% and higher.157
A final reason for why the presumption should not be
irrefutable is that actual foreclosure levels are not
necessarily indicative of the foreclosure levels that are
required for the elimination of competition. Consider, for
example, an industry in which foreclosure of 92% is observed.
The industry may theoretically be one in which the
elimination of competition requires the foreclosure of only
65%. And if this is the case, the industry is one in which the
presumption of pro-competitiveness should not be invoked. It
is of course unclear why exclusivity arrangements would be
struck with 92% of the market if 65% are enough to foreclose
the market. But theoretically, the additional agreements,
while redundant in terms of forestalling competition, may
have been signed in order to invoke the presumption of
legality and conceal the fact that 65% of the market were
sufficient to forestall competition.158

156. Melamed, supra note 110, at 376, points to the inflexibility that has
resulted from the focus on the lower threshold in the present context:
“…[A]lthough rules of thumb like a specified percent foreclosure test are not
unrelated to the competition issues raised by exclusive dealing agreements, they
are often too wooden and inflexible to provide a sound basis for decision.”
157. Of course, there may be cases in which collective action problems exist
even when the elimination of competition requires foreclosure of 99%.
Theoretically, if each of 100 retailers holds a 1% market share, the collective
action problem will prevail even if the elimination of competition requires
foreclosure of 99%. But as a practical matter this seems like an unrealistic
qualification: if any of the retailers holds a market share that is even marginally
greater (say, 1.01%), the collective action problem will be spontaneously
eliminated and there will be a natural check on anti-competitive exclusivity.
Additionally, hold-out problems and transaction costs make it far more difficult
to achieve foreclosure under these circumstances.
158. Once the monopoly has been secured by virtue of the 65% foreclosure,
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Notwithstanding its proposed refutability, exclusivity
arrangements foreclosing market shares in excess of 85%
should, counter-intuitively, enjoy a presumption of procompetitiveness. At extremely large foreclosed market
shares, the probability that exclusivity arrangements are
being used to an anti-competitive end decreases
dramatically, and it becomes far more likely that their
intended and actual effects are welfare enhancing.
V. CONCLUSION
Contemporary antitrust doctrine routinely, and in fact
almost automatically, condemns exclusivity arrangements
foreclosing extremely large market shares.159 Antitrust
doctrine is, in this respect, in line with antitrust theory
which has surprisingly overlooked a key upshot of the
understanding that anti-competitive exclusivity can
normally be achieved only if a collective action problem exists
among the entities granting exclusivity.
The argument pressed in this Article is that within the
framework of the rule of reason, courts should be mindful of
the fact that exclusion of competitors through exclusivity
agreements is unlikely not only when the foreclosed market
share is relatively small, but also when the foreclosed market
share is extremely large. Contemporary antitrust law
wrongly condemns such arrangements. An immeasurable
number of welfare-enhancing business arrangements are
nipped in the bud.

additional outlets seem to have little reason to resist an offer to sign exclusivity
agreements, at least in terms of enhancement of monopoly power.
159. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.

